Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell script used to extract hidden payloads from BMP image files via RGB pixel channel parsing, as observed in multi-stage Remcos RAT loader campaign. This technique is often used to conceal malicious code within seemingly innocuous image files.
Detects `cmd.exe` starting PowerShell with hidden-window, bypass execution policy, and encoded-content options, which is a common technique used by malware like Banana RAT to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh.exe being launched with command-line arguments indicating hidden windows, execution policy bypass, or encoded commands, with `cmd.exe` as the parent process.
Detects the Microsoft Management Console (mmc.exe) spawning PowerShell with command-line arguments indicative of fileless execution, specifically using 'IEX' and 'DownloadString' or 'Net.WebClient' to retrieve and execute code from a remote location.
Detects collection of event log size, retention, record count, and audit policy categories to understand defensive visibility. This rule specifically looks for the execution of 'powershell.exe' with 'Get-WinEvent -ListLog Security' or 'auditpol.exe' with '/get /category' command-line arguments.
Detects usage of common built-in tools (driverquery.exe, sc.exe) and PowerShell commands (Get-WindowsDriver, WMI queries for Win32_PnPSignedDriver or Win32_SystemDriver) used to enumerate installed system drivers. This is often part of reconnaissance to identify third-party drivers for BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.
Detects suspicious activities within a Veeam backup environment, including unauthorized process spawning by Veeam services, LSASS memory access, destruction of backup catalogs or restore points via PowerShell, and unauthorized access to Veeam database files by non-Veeam processes.
This rule detects indicators of the 'RoguePlanet' exploit, which leverages ISO image mounting to stage malicious files. It monitors for the execution of Windows Error Reporting (wermgr.exe) from virtual CD-ROM devices, unauthorized use of PowerShell to mount DiskImages or VHDs, and the creation of specific filesystem paths (RP_<UUID> directories) commonly associated with RoguePlanet exploit activity.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities including wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through direct event log event ID triggers (1102, 104). This activity is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their presence on a system.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin, diskshadow) and PowerShell to delete Volume Shadow Copies or disable system recovery features. These activities are commonly used by ransomware to prevent easy restoration of encrypted data.
Detects PowerShell invoking ScriptBlock::Create or Invoke-Expression on decrypted in-memory text, which is a technique used by malware like Banana RAT to execute obfuscated or dynamically generated code.
Detects the presence of specific keywords within PowerShell Script Block logs (EventCode 4104) that are characteristic of Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass techniques. These include attempts to manipulate the AMSI context, reflectively load assemblies to modify memory, or force scan failures.
Detects Microsoft Outlook spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) followed by a network connection originating from that interpreter within a 5-minute window. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicative of malicious macro execution or exploit delivery via email attachments leading to command-and-control activity.
Detects execution patterns associated with the Havoc C2 framework's Demon implant. This includes PowerShell loaders with encoded/non-interactive flags spawned by suspicious script interpreters, PowerShell execution spawned from explorer.exe, and suspicious remote thread injection into explorer.exe from unauthorized processes.
Detects the installation of the OpenSSH Server feature or the creation of an 'sshd' service on Windows workstations. Adversaries may install OpenSSH as a persistent, covert backdoor to maintain access to a compromised host.
Detects a multi-stage in-memory delivery chain associated with Operation Poisson, where wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe to load and execute the Havoc Demon agent in memory via a VBScript stager.
Detects anomalous frequency of UAC elevation prompts (consent.exe) initiated by PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts, specifically matching the pattern of repeated Start-Process -Verb RunAs usage to solicit user interaction for UAC elevation.
Detects instances where 'RemotePCService.exe' or 'rpccmdhost.exe' (associated with remote access software) spawn 'powershell.exe' with suspicious command-line arguments. These arguments often indicate attempts to execute obfuscated commands, download content from the internet, or execute code in memory, which can be indicative of malicious activity leveraging legitimate remote access tools.
This rule detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands (encoded) that subsequently establish an external network connection and perform process injection within a short timeframe (120 seconds). This behavior is characteristic of malicious staged execution, where a PowerShell script acts as a dropper or loader to fetch secondary payloads and inject them into other processes for evasion.
This rule identifies instances of PowerShell executing with an encoded command followed immediately (within 300 seconds) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard port or non-internal IP address. This behavior is indicative of a remote access tool or reverse shell establishing command and control (C2) communication.
Detects network connections or DNS queries to ErrTraffic Beer cluster domains impersonating AI platforms (ChatGPT, Google Antigravity) delivering DanaBot/HijackLoader via BSOD or reCAPTCHA ClickFix lures, and subsequent browser-spawned PowerShell execution.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution chains (-nop, -w hidden, iex (gc) used in ClickFix RAT delivery.
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