Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
85 detections
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Detects the creation of a JavaScript file in unusual subdirectories of the Google Chrome user data or application support folders. This behavior was observed in the 'graphalgo' campaign by the Lazarus Group to stage second-stage payloads.
Detects TTPs associated with the Lazarus Group malware families OtterCookie and BeaverTail. This rule identifies persistence via registry run keys and scheduled tasks, suspicious node.js execution for keylogging, and network connections to known C2 infrastructure.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the OtterCookie malware, part of the Lazarus "Contagious Interview" campaign. It specifically looks for the creation of a 'NodeHelper' registry run key and a 'NodeUpdate' scheduled task.
Detects when a Visual Studio Code process spawns a shell that immediately downloads and executes a script using a tool like `curl` and pipes it to a runtime like `node`. This indicates the abuse of `tasks.json` for code execution, a technique used by DPRK-linked actors.
Detects the creation of a macOS Launch Agent by a suspicious process or with a name matching patterns used by the BlueNoroff group. BlueNoroff uses Launch Agents for persistence on compromised macOS systems.
Detects the creation or modification of the '/tmp/sslvpn.log' file, a known artifact of a new Linux variant of the Lazarus BADCALL backdoor.
This rule detects command and control (C2) communication associated with the Lazarus Group's ScoringMathTea Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header matches a known string used by this malware: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/107.0.1418.42'. This User-Agent string attempts to masquerade as a legitimate Microsoft Edge browser.
Detects ScoringMathTea malware by identifying its custom in-line CRC32 table generation routine. This routine, used for integrity checks and anti-debugging, utilizes a unique polynomial constant (0x04C10DB7).
Detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity associated with Lazarus Group malware, such as Cryptoistic. This rule identifies outbound TCP connections that do not appear to be using a standard application-layer protocol like HTTP/S, which is a characteristic of some custom backdoors used by the group. The rule filters for successful outbound TCP connections with an empty RemoteUrl, excluding private IP ranges and a allowlist of common processes. It further prioritizes processes running from suspicious user-writable locations and requires more than two connection attempts to reduce noise.
Detects DLL side-loading patterns associated with the Lazarus Group's Operation DreamJob campaign. This involves legitimate Windows executables loading malicious DLLs from non-standard paths.
Detects potential DLL sideloading associated with the Lazarus Group's DreamLoader campaign. This involves legitimate Windows executables (wkspbroker.exe, wksprt.exe) being executed from non-standard directories shortly after a DLL is created in the same location.
This rule detects specific DLL sideloading activity observed to be used by the Diamond Sleet APT group. It looks for the loading of 'Version.dll' by 'clip.exe' or 'DSROLE.dll' by 'wsmprovhost.exe' when these executables and DLLs are located in the 'ProgramData' directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code by tricking legitimate applications into loading their crafted DLLs.
Detects the sideloading of specific trojanized DLLs by legitimate Windows executables, a technique observed in Lazarus APT campaigns targeting a Spanish aerospace company. The rule identifies suspicious DLL loads by monitoring 'ImageLoaded' events for particular DLLs being loaded by specific executables from unusual paths, indicating potential DLL hijacking or sideloading for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.
Detects the installation of malicious npm packages, such as 'node-nvm-ssh', used by the Famous Chollima group. The detection focuses on suspicious post-install scripts executed by node.exe, which is a known TTP for this actor to deliver malware like BeaverTail and OtterCookie.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the command line includes common scripting interpreters (powershell, pwsh, cmd) and specifies a suspicious folder path like 'C:\ProgramData\' or '%ProgramData%'. This combination is often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation by scheduling malicious code to run from a location typically used for application data, which can be less monitored than system directories.
Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location. This can indicate an attempt by an adversary to masquerade malicious executables as legitimate system processes to evade detection.
Detects TTPs associated with a Lazarus subgroup using the SessionEnv service for persistence and privilege escalation. This involves phantom DLL loading, service auto-start configuration, and registry modification for elevated privileges.
Detects the PerfhLoader persistence technique used by the Lazarus Group, which involves modifying the 'SessionEnv' service to start automatically and either adding sensitive privileges or dropping a malicious DLL for phantom loading. This rule correlates events across process launches (sc.exe modifying SessionEnv service), registry modifications (adding privileges to SessionEnv service), and file creations (dropping a specific DLL for phantom loading).
This rule identifies emails originating from sender addresses listed in a GitHub-hosted CSV file, which is explicitly named 'North-Korean-Emails'. The rule's purpose is to flag incoming emails that appear to be sent from individuals or entities associated with North Korea, based on the provided list of email addresses. This could indicate potential phishing, espionage, or other malicious activities originating from North Korean threat actors.
This rule detects attempts by scripting language interpreters (Node.js, Python, PowerShell) to access sensitive browser credential files such as 'Login Data', 'Web Data', and 'Cookies' from Chrome and Brave browser user data directories. It also includes specific file paths that might be associated with known browser extensions or malware that target these files. This activity is indicative of credential dumping or information stealing.
This rule detects the installation of specific malicious open-source packages using npm or pip. It looks for process executions of 'npm.exe', 'pip.exe', 'pip3.exe', 'npm', or 'pip3' with 'install' in their command line, specifically targeting known malicious package names like 'winston-compose', 'nodemailer-helper', 'servula', 'velocky', 'vite-postcss-helper', 'pycryptoconf', and 'pycryptoenv'. This activity is indicative of supply chain compromise attempts, potentially by groups like Lazarus Group, who have been known to leverage such tactics.
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