Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil, PowerShell, wmic, etc.) or log-reading tools (grep, tail) for log enumeration or export when executed by processes that are not standard management or monitoring agents. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary efforts to gain situational awareness or identify security logs.
The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with the "clear-log" parameter in order to clear the contents of logs.
Clearing the event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations.
Clearing the event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations.
The following analytic detects the execution of "wevtutil.exe" with parameters to disable event logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because disabling event logs is a common tactic used by ransomware to evade detection and hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond effectively to the incident.
Detects the use of the wevtutil.exe utility to clear multiple Windows event logs simultaneously. This is a common defense evasion technique used by attackers to hide malicious activity by deleting security, system, application, or setup event logs.
Detects the use of wevtutil.exe to clear the Microsoft-Windows-Defender/Operational event log, which is often done by adversaries to remove evidence of security software activity or detection.
Detects the execution of the Windows Event Utility (wevtutil.exe) with the 'cl' (clear-log) command, specifically targeting multiple critical event logs simultaneously. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic activity aimed at obfuscating post-compromise actions, as seen in the Settra ransomware campaign.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the command-line utility 'wevtutil.exe' or the PowerShell cmdlet 'Clear-EventLog'. Additionally, it monitors for Windows Security Event ID 1102, which specifically indicates the clearing of the Security log. These actions are common indicators of an adversary attempting to remove evidence of their activity from a host system.
Detects clear-text attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog' command patterns within network traffic, indicating a potential attempt to remove evidence of malicious activity on a host.
Detects clear-text attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog' command patterns within network traffic, indicating a potential attempt to remove evidence of malicious activity on a host.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using common utilities like 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog', or execution triggered by batch scripts (e.g., i.bat), which is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their activities.
This rule detects activities associated with the StrikeShark SharkLoader malware, specifically its attempts to suppress Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and tamper with event logs. It identifies the use of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear security logs, 'auditpol.exe' to disable audit categories, the loading of specific DLLs ('SyncRes.dat', 'DscCoreR.mui', 'SystemSettings.dll') from suspicious AppData paths, and processes originating from these suspicious AppData paths spawning 'wevtutil.exe' or 'auditpol.exe'.
Detects suspicious file deletion activities using 'del' command with '/f' flag or 'Remove-Item' PowerShell cmdlet, and log clearing activities using 'wevtutil cl' or 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. It also identifies Windows Event Log clearing events (Event ID 1102). The rule also includes a specific check for known malicious artifacts in the command line.
Detects instances where Windows event logs are cleared using built-in utilities (wevtutil.exe) or PowerShell (Get-EventLog/Get-WinEvent, Clear-EventLog) shortly after those same logs were queried or enumerated by the same user on the same device. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to conceal malicious activity.
Detects the use of the Windows command-line utility 'wevtutil.exe' to clear Windows event logs. Attackers often clear logs to hide evidence of post-compromise activity.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the built-in 'wevtutil.exe' utility or PowerShell cmdlets 'Clear-EventLog'. Adversaries often perform this action to remove evidence of malicious activity from the host.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the wevtutil.exe command-line utility or by triggering native Windows Event Log IDs 1102 (Security log cleared) or 104 (System log cleared). Clearing these logs is a common technique used by adversaries to hide indicators of malicious activity following an intrusion.
Detects the clearing of multiple Windows Event Logs using the built-in 'wevtutil.exe' utility. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their presence or activities by clearing system, security, or application event logs.
Detects the use of the Windows command-line utility 'wevtutil.exe' to clear Windows event logs. Attackers often clear logs to hide evidence of post-compromise activity.
Detects instances where Windows event logs are cleared using built-in utilities (wevtutil.exe) or PowerShell (Get-EventLog/Get-WinEvent, Clear-EventLog) shortly after those same logs were queried or enumerated by the same user on the same device. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to conceal malicious activity.
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using command line tools like wevtutil or PowerShell. This is a standard example rule.
Detects the usage of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear critical Windows event logs (Application, Security, System, Windows PowerShell). This activity is often associated with defense evasion tactics used by adversaries, including ransomware like VECT, to remove forensic evidence.
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