Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects clear-text attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog' command patterns within network traffic, indicating a potential attempt to remove evidence of malicious activity on a host.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities to inhibit system recovery (e.g., deleting shadow copies or boot configuration changes) and to clear system event logs. These behaviors are common precursors or indicators of post-exploitation activity, such as ransomware deployment or intrusion cleanup.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with VILE ransomware, specifically focused on defense evasion through Windows event log clearing, termination of security-related processes, and the presence of specific ransomware-related configuration or identity files in common staging directories.
This rule detects when the Windows Security Event Log has been cleared, which is often an indicator that an adversary is attempting to hide their tracks and remove evidence of unauthorized activities on a system.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using native utilities (wevtutil), remove shell history files (bash_history, PowerShell history), or perform secure file deletion using cipher.exe, which are techniques commonly used by attackers to remove forensic evidence of their activities.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the wevtutil command-line utility or PowerShell cmdlets (Clear-EventLog, Remove-EventLog). Adversaries often clear event logs to hinder forensic investigations and remove evidence of their malicious activity.
Detects clear-text attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog' command patterns within network traffic, indicating a potential attempt to remove evidence of malicious activity on a host.
This rule detects when the Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 1102) has been cleared on a system. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by adversaries to remove traces of their activity and evade detection.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using common utilities like 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog', or execution triggered by batch scripts (e.g., i.bat), which is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their activities.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil' command-line utility or PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' command. The rule applies elevated risk levels when the activity is initiated by system-level processes or accounts, which is often indicative of adversary activity attempting to remove forensic evidence of post-exploitation actions.
This rule detects activities associated with the StrikeShark SharkLoader malware, specifically its attempts to suppress Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and tamper with event logs. It identifies the use of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear security logs, 'auditpol.exe' to disable audit categories, the loading of specific DLLs ('SyncRes.dat', 'DscCoreR.mui', 'SystemSettings.dll') from suspicious AppData paths, and processes originating from these suspicious AppData paths spawning 'wevtutil.exe' or 'auditpol.exe'.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Windows security products and logging mechanisms. This includes stopping security services, clearing event logs, using PowerShell to modify security preferences (e.g., Windows Defender exclusions or real-time monitoring), and modifying registry keys to disable security features.
This rule detects activities related to clearing or deleting Windows Event Logs, including usage of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear specific logs, 'cmd.exe' or PowerShell ('Remove-Item') to manually delete '.evtx' files, and the erasure of the USN journal via 'fsutil.exe'. It also detects the actual occurrence of Event IDs 1102 (Security log cleared) and 104 (System log cleared). The rule correlates these events with preceding service installations within the last 24 hours to distinguish between potential attacker anti-forensics activity and routine administrative maintenance.
Detects various phases of the Grixba infostealer infection lifecycle, including persistence via file drops in public user directories, malicious DLL/payload creation, reconnaissance data exfiltration, security software tampering (Windows Defender, AMSI, WLDP), and event log clearing via wevtutil.
Detects the clearing of Windows Security and System event logs, or Defender XDR audit logs, indicating potential adversary activity to remove traces of their actions.
Detects suspicious file deletion activities using 'del' command with '/f' flag or 'Remove-Item' PowerShell cmdlet, and log clearing activities using 'wevtutil cl' or 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. It also identifies Windows Event Log clearing events (Event ID 1102). The rule also includes a specific check for known malicious artifacts in the command line.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native command-line utility 'wevtutil' or PowerShell cmdlets 'Clear-EventLog' and 'Remove-EventLog'. Adversaries often perform this action to remove evidence of their activities from security, system, and application logs. The rule includes exclusions for common administrative, backup, and security-related processes to minimize false positives.
Detects instances where Windows event logs are cleared using built-in utilities (wevtutil.exe) or PowerShell (Get-EventLog/Get-WinEvent, Clear-EventLog) shortly after those same logs were queried or enumerated by the same user on the same device. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to conceal malicious activity.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using wevtutil or PowerShell, and the suspicious deletion of files in sensitive directories (AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Users) using the command prompt. These behaviors are commonly associated with anti-forensics and data destruction activities used by adversaries to hide their tracks during an intrusion.
Detects usage of the Windows Event Utility (wevtutil.exe) with the 'cl' command-line flag, which is commonly used to clear specific Windows Event logs such as Security, System, Application, or Setup. This behavior is frequently associated with attackers attempting to remove forensic artifacts and log entries after unauthorized activity.
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