Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects various techniques used by an adversary to clear, truncate, or delete system and audit logs to hide their activity. It monitors for commands targeting Windows Event Logs (wevtutil, Clear-EventLog), Linux system logs (/var/log/ via rm/shred), and journalctl vacuuming, as well as the deletion of .evtx files. It further enriches these detections by identifying if the process was spawned by suspicious parent processes often associated with remote access, lateral movement, or command-and-control activity.
Detects suspicious command execution on Linux-based SOHO/IoT devices, specifically targeting patterns associated with log deletion, unauthorized cron job modification, busybox utility abuse, and temporary directory execution. This activity is often linked to botnet recruitment and reconnaissance behaviors such as those observed in the JDY and Volt Typhoon campaigns.
Detects attempts to delete or clear Linux system logs using common utilities (rm, shred, truncate, echo, cat) targeting critical log paths such as /var/log/syslog, /var/log/messages, and other authentication or kernel logs. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to remove evidence of their actions from the local system.
Detects evidence of log deletion, logrotate configuration modification, or syslog daemon termination (rsyslog, syslog-ng, journald) occurring within 30 minutes of suspicious child process activity from common web application interpreters (e.g., python, node, java, php). This correlation pattern is a strong indicator of post-exploitation activity aimed at clearing tracks or impairing host logging services.
Detects clearing of bash command history to remove forensic evidence
Detects coordinated security defense evasion activities by the Lambsys cryptominer campaign. The rule triggers when a shell process (bash, sh, or dash) is used to stop or disable security services (auditd, ClamAV, osquery, Falco, CrowdStrike Falcon), forcibly terminate their processes using pkill or kill -9, and delete or shred critical system security and audit logs (auth.log, syslog, audit).
This rule detects attempts to tamper with critical Linux log files such as /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog, and /var/log/audit/audit.log. It specifically looks for file deletion or modification events, or process creation events that involve commands like 'rm', 'shred', 'truncate', 'unlink', or 'dd' targeting these log files. Legitimate processes like 'logrotate', 'rsyslog', 'syslog-ng', 'auditd', 'systemd', and 'journald' are excluded to reduce false positives.
Detects attempts by a user or process to clear audit logs, system logs, or command history, often used by adversaries to cover their tracks on a compromised system. The rule monitors for file deletion (rm, shred), content truncation (truncate), selective line removal (sed -i), and shell history suppression (HISTFILE=/dev/null, history -c) against sensitive log and history paths.
This rule identifies suspicious command-line activity indicative of log manipulation, truncation, or deletion on Cisco SD-WAN controllers. It monitors for the execution of utilities like 'rm', 'shred', 'truncate', 'bash', 'cat', and 'echo' targeting critical system logs, including '/var/log/auth.log' and various 'vdebug' log files. By detecting these anti-forensic techniques, the rule flags potential attempts by adversaries to conceal post-exploitation activity or clear audit trails.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with critical Linux log files such as /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog, and /var/log/audit/audit.log. It specifically looks for file deletion or modification events, or process creation events that involve commands like 'rm', 'shred', 'truncate', 'unlink', or 'dd' targeting these log files. Legitimate processes like 'logrotate', 'rsyslog', 'syslog-ng', 'auditd', 'systemd', and 'journald' are excluded to reduce false positives.
This rule detects attempts to clear syslog files by looking for the command 'truncate -s 0' followed by 'syslog' within an SSH session. This activity is often associated with an attacker trying to remove evidence of their presence on a compromised system.
Detects clearing of Linux system log files to remove forensic evidence
This rule detects attempts to clear system log files, specifically '/var/log/', via a remote SSH connection. It looks for the string "> /var/log/" within TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) flowing from a client to a server, ignoring case. This activity is often associated with an attacker trying to cover their tracks by removing evidence of their presence.
This rule detects potential log tampering activities on Linux systems followed by service manipulation within a 20-minute window on the same host.
This rule detects attempts to clear or truncate journal logs on Linux systems. Adversaries may clear logs to remove evidence of their activities.
Detects log file modification followed by service manipulation to cover tracks.
Used /dev/null, therefore it acts as a stronger version of disable
Used /dev/null, therefore it acts as a stronger version of disable
Detects deletion of local audit logs
Detects logs clearing attempts on Linux systems via utilities such as 'rm', 'rmdir', 'shred', and 'unlink' targeting log files and directories.
Adversaries often try to clear logs to cover their tracks after performing malicious activities.
Adversaries often try to clear logs to cover their tracks after performing malicious activities.
Detects specific commands commonly used to remove or empty the syslog. Which is a technique often used by attacker as a method to hide their tracks
This rule detects suspicious modifications or creations of Linux login log files (wtmp, btmp, utmp, lastlog, utmpx, wtmpx) by processes that are not legitimate system processes typically associated with managing these logs. Adversaries may modify or clear these logs to hide their presence on a system or to manipulate login records.
Detects the deletion or clearing of critical Cisco SD-WAN log files. This is a common post-exploitation technique used by attackers to cover their tracks after compromising a device, for instance, after exploiting CVE-2026-20127. The rule identifies direct file deletions and commands used to clear or truncate log file content.
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