Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,247 detections
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This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
Detects high-volume network activity from a single device/process to public IP addresses over common ports (80, 443) or UDP protocol. This behavior is indicative of potential command and control communication, automated data exfiltration, or a scanning attempt.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects specific JSON-RPC calls indicating C2 communication associated with the Graphalgo RAT. The rule identifies calls to the 'eth_call' method referencing specific function names like 'setCPubKey', 'serviceData', or a hardcoded Arbitrum Sepolia contract address used as a blockchain dead-drop mechanism.
Detects established, bidirectional TCP connections between internal hosts and known infrastructure associated with the SIDEEYE backdoor on specific control and data ports (3333 and 3334).
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the ARToken PhaaS backend infrastructure. It identifies specific fixed URI paths and cross-affiliate API route contracts used by the backend service, as well as known indicators of compromise for affiliate infrastructure, to monitor for potential credential harvesting or adversary-controlled service interaction.
Detects instances where the Claude Desktop application spawns a terminal or shell process that immediately executes commands associated with downloading remote payloads or accessing sensitive cryptocurrency wallet artifacts. This behavior is indicative of potential AI prompt injection where an AI assistant is coerced into executing malicious commands without user authorization.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects network indicators associated with the Exvicy/ErrTraffic 'ClickFix' campaign. The rule identifies the retrieval of malicious HTML lure templates from compromised WordPress sites and subsequent telemetry/registration calls to an attacker-controlled 'api.php' script, which are precursors to the fake Cloudflare Turnstile 'Win+R' execution sequence.
This rule monitors for outbound TCP and HTTP traffic to a known malicious infrastructure hosting a fake or compromised 'Corp MDM' (Mobile Device Management) admin panel, which serves as a Command and Control (C2) channel for spyware.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
Detects instances where the rnpkeys.exe process initiates a network connection shortly after its execution. The RNP (OpenPGP) utility is generally used for local cryptographic operations; unexpected network activity from this process may indicate potential misuse, data exfiltration, or malicious use of the tool for command-and-control communication.
Detects suspicious processes frequently polling Hugging Face repository endpoints (discussions, raw files, commits). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using public code/dataset hosting services as a covert command-and-control (C2) channel to fetch instructions or exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network filters by blending in with legitimate developer traffic.
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