Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential remote code execution associated with the exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability CVE-2025-61882 on Windows hosts. The rule looks for a Java process spawning a command shell to execute reconnaissance commands, followed by an outbound network connection from the same Java process within a short time frame. This behavior is consistent with post-exploitation activity observed in the campaign.
Detects the execution of suspicious commands often used in Command and Control (C2) activities, as identified in Florian Roth's 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'. These commands include `wget`, `curl`, `base64`, `nc`, `netcat`, `ncat`, `ssh`, `socat`, `wireshark`, `rawshark`, `rdesktop`, and `nmap`. These tools can be leveraged for various adversarial techniques such as data transfer, remote access, network discovery, and data encoding.
The analytic detects FTP connections initiated by processes located in non-standard installation paths on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify network connections where the process image path does not match common directories like "Program Files" or "Windows\System32". This activity is significant as FTP is often used by adversaries and malware, such as AgentTesla, for Command and Control (C2) communications to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, exposing sensitive information and compromising the integrity of the affected host.
Detects an office suite application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) communicating to target systems over uncommon ports. This rule specifically looks for network connections initiated by these applications, excluding common ports used for DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, SMB, LDAP, and specific Outlook-related ports (IMAP, POP3, SMTP).
Detects suspicious activities as declared by Florian Roth in its 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'.
This includes the detection of the following commands; wget, curl, base64, nc, netcat, ncat, ssh, socat, wireshark, rawshark, rdesktop, nmap.
These commands match a few techniques from the tactics "Command and Control", including not exhaustively the following; Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095), Data Encoding (T1132)
This includes the detection of the following commands; wget, curl, base64, nc, netcat, ncat, ssh, socat, wireshark, rawshark, rdesktop, nmap.
These commands match a few techniques from the tactics "Command and Control", including not exhaustively the following; Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095), Data Encoding (T1132)
Detects AdaptixC2 beacon (PE) and shellcode loader components based on unique code patterns and API hashes.
This rule correlates Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) SmartScreen and Network Protection blocks with network activity logs. It specifically looks for instances where SmartScreenUrlWarning or ExploitGuardNetworkProtectionBlocked events occur due to 'CustomBlockList' or 'CustomPolicy' settings. The rule then joins these events with DeviceNetworkEvents to identify the associated URLs, remote IP addresses, and ports involved in the blocked network communication. The primary goal is to identify and provide context for network access attempts that are blocked by custom security policies, indicating potential malicious or unwanted website access.
Detects processes potentially related to XillenStealer making outbound network connections or DNS queries for telegram.org. This is indicative of command and control or data exfiltration activity.
This rule detects potential C2 communication patterns associated with the NightshadeC2 botnet. It looks for outbound TCP connections from non-browser processes to specific ports used by the malware, or connections to Steam community pages which are used to host C2 addresses. It also identifies initial geo-IP lookups from non-browser processes.
This rule detects a suspicious file download from a known web server or SQL related process which has been identified in the GhostRedirector campaign.
This rule detects communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with known malicious MD5 or SHA256 hashes. It correlates threat intelligence with network and endpoint telemetry to identify compromised devices or accounts.
This rule detects the presence of potentially malicious or unwanted browser extensions and outbound network connections to known adware or tracking domains. It correlates extension presence with network behavior to identify threats.
This rule detects the installation of potentially unwanted or suspicious applications, specifically looking for a sponsored version of FileZilla. It then correlates this installation with outbound network activity to public IP addresses, which could indicate telemetry, beaconing, data exfiltration, or command and control (C2) behavior.
This rule identifies devices connected to Wi-Fi networks with public IP addresses and correlates those connections with outbound network events. It aims to provide process-level context for connections originating from such network configurations, including geolocation of both local and remote IPs. This could indicate unusual or unauthorized network activity, potentially related to command and control or data exfiltration from devices on less secure network segments.
Detects ERMAC V3.0 C2/panel/builder traffic using backend API routes, auth artifacts, exfil paths, injects directory indicators, and unique strings from the source leak. Emphasizes multi-indicator matches in the same event for high confidence.
Detects anomalous system behavior that could indicate sophisticated threats deviating from normal activity. This includes unusual process-parent relationships, unexpected network connections from scripting engines, and attempts to modify registry keys related to AMSI or ETW configuration.
Detects DNS queries for domains known to be used by the DarkCloud campaign for payload delivery and C2 communication. This rule specifically targets domains used for initial payload download, final payload delivery, and public IP address determination.
This detection identifies potential usage of the Naabu port scanner by searching for its process execution or its specific network user-agent string. Naabu is a fast port scanner that can be used for network reconnaissance.
This rule identifies network traffic to known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Katz Stealer malware family. It uses a list of hardcoded IP addresses and domains from threat intelligence to detect suspicious outbound connections.
Detects network traffic to command and control (C2) servers associated with the Katz Stealer malware, identified by known IP addresses and domains.
Detects network traffic to known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses associated with the SuperBlack ransomware.
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