Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the installation of MSIX/AppX packages with full trust privileges. This detection leverages Windows event logs from the AppXDeployment-Server, specifically focusing on EventCode 400 which indicates a package deployment operation. Full trust packages are significant as they run with elevated privileges outside the normal AppX container restrictions, allowing them to access system resources that regular AppX packages cannot. Adversaries have been observed leveraging full trust MSIX packages to deliver malware, as documented in recent threat intelligence reports. If confirmed malicious, these packages could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, establish persistence, or deliver malware while evading traditional detection mechanisms.
This detection identifies the installation of developer-signed MSIX packages that lack Microsoft Store signatures. All malicious MSIX packages observed in recent threat campaigns (including those from FIN7, Zloader/Storm-0569, and FakeBat/Storm-1113) were developer-signed rather than Microsoft Store signed. Microsoft Store apps have specific publisher IDs containing '8wekyb3d8bbwe' or 'cw5n1h2txyewy', while developer-signed packages lack these identifiers. This detection focuses on EventID 855 from the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational logs, which indicates a completed package installation.
This analytic detects successful MSIX/AppX package installations on Windows systems by monitoring EventID 854 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational log. This event is generated when an MSIX/AppX package has been successfully installed on a system. While most package installations are legitimate, monitoring these events can help identify unauthorized or suspicious package installations, especially when correlated with other events such as unsigned package installations (EventID 603 with Flags=8388608) or full trust package installations (EventID 400 with HasFullTrust=true).
This hunting query detects user interactions with MSIX packages by monitoring EventCode 171 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXPackaging/Operational logs. These events are generated when a user clicks on or attempts to interact with an MSIX package, even if the package is not fully installed. This information can be valuable for security teams to identify what MSIX packages users are attempting to open in their environment, which may help detect malicious MSIX packages before they're fully installed. Monitoring these interactions can provide early warning of potential MSIX package abuse, which has been leveraged by threat actors such as FIN7, Zloader (Storm-0569), and FakeBat (Storm-1113).
This rule detects activities associated with the RomCom threat group, including exploitation of CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR path traversal), COM hijacking for persistence, anti-analysis techniques (RecentDocs check), C2 communication, and suspicious WMIC execution, potentially linked to a Mythic agent.
Detects suspicious activities related to CVE-2025-8088 WinRAR exploitation, including malicious file creation, COM hijacking, C2 communication, and anti-analysis techniques. Enhanced with ADS detection, command-line analysis, and refined false positive handling. This threat is now attributed to RomCom.
Detects various Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with UAT-7237 activity, including file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs. This rule identifies suspicious process executions based on known malicious file hashes and network connections to malicious IP addresses or URLs.
Detects specially crafted RAR archives that exploit the CVE-2025-8088 directory traversal vulnerability. This technique is used to drop files into the Windows Startup folder for persistence, as seen in campaigns by the RomCom threat actor.
Detects .lnk (shortcut) files launched by scripting engines (e.g., PowerShell, CMD, WScript) exhibiting suspicious traits like hidden execution, embedded commands, or admin privilege requests. Common in phishing, LOLBin abuse, and initial access.
RAR SFX-based dropper that extracts a JS payload (DarkWatchman-style)
This query uses MOTW to identify users who have downloaded files from a URI that contains an IP (eg ; https://1.1.1.1/somefile.iso)
Should always be suspicious! Tweak the extensions if you have other extensions in mind.
Should always be suspicious! Tweak the extensions if you have other extensions in mind.
This rule detects a potentially malicious Human Interface Device (HID) attack where a newly connected keyboard device (e.g., a USB Rubber Ducky) immediately triggers the execution of a script interpreter such as PowerShell, CMD, or MSHTA. The correlation occurs within 60 seconds of device insertion, which is characteristic of HID-based keystroke injection attacks.
Detects the download of a Java Archive (.jar) file from common file-sharing services like Dropbox or MediaFire. This behavior is associated with sophisticated email campaigns where attackers use PDF attachments with embedded links to trick users into downloading and executing Remote Access Trojans (RATs).
Detects execution of files from Downloads, Temp, or AppData folders by browsers, indicating potential FileFix attacks where malicious files are downloaded and immediately executed.
Detects suspicious commands written to the RunMRU registry key. This is a characteristic of the "ClickFix" social engineering technique, where a user is tricked into copying a malicious command and executing it via the Windows Run dialog (Win+R). This technique is notably used by Lumma Stealer affiliates.
Detects Windows Script Host execution of suspicious file types from browsers, often used in FileFix attacks to execute malicious VBScript or JScript files.
Description: Detects the execution of a signed macOS application that subsequently spawns a script interpreter like osascript, sh, or bash. This behavior is uncommon for many legitimate GUI applications but is a known TTP for macOS malware like Odyssey Stealer, which uses signed droppers to execute malicious scripts for credential theft, persistence, and payload delivery.
This detection rule identifies the creation of ISO (.iso) files on endpoints, specifically focusing on those created by common internet browsers and email clients. This activity is associated with the SLOW#TEMPEST campaign, which is known to distribute malware payloads via ISO files, often bundled with legitimate applications and malicious DLLs. The rule aims to detect the initial delivery vector of this threat.
This query identifies when a suspicious SVG file, linked to known threat intelligence, is downloaded via a browser. This technique is often used for SVG smuggling, where attackers embed malicious JavaScript or links within the SVG's structure to bypass traditional content filters or sandboxing. Once rendered in the browser, the embedded content may redirect the victim to a malicious site or initiate further malicious activity.
Detects various initial access TTPs associated with the "ClickFix" attack vector, where users are tricked into running malicious commands. This includes behaviors observed in Lumma Stealer, Latrodectus, and NetSupport RAT campaigns.
Detects suspicious command-line activity associated with the "ClickFix" social engineering technique.
Threat actors trick users into pasting and executing malicious commands that typically use scripting engines or built-in utilities to download and run subsequent payloads.
This rule identifies patterns seen in recent NetSupport RAT, Latrodectus, and Lumma Stealer campaigns using this vector.
Threat actors trick users into pasting and executing malicious commands that typically use scripting engines or built-in utilities to download and run subsequent payloads.
This rule identifies patterns seen in recent NetSupport RAT, Latrodectus, and Lumma Stealer campaigns using this vector.
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