Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of msxsl.exe or wmic.exe to process .xsl or .xslt files, potentially indicating the execution of embedded scripts. The rule calculates a risk score based on the combination of the utility name, the presence of an XSL/XSLT file reference in the command line, usage of suspicious file paths (e.g., Temp, AppData), and being launched by potentially suspicious parent processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
The following analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script
via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data,
focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT
switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control
bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary
code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool,
posing a severe threat to the environment.
via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data,
focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT
switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control
bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary
code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool,
posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of an XSL script using the WMIC process, which is often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving WMIC and XSL files. This behavior is significant as it has been associated with the FIN7 group, known for using this technique to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious actions within the environment.
This analytic identifies the use of `msxsl.exe` initiating a network connection to a non-private IP address.
Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it
to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner.
This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections
that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it
to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner.
This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections
that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
Detects the use of WMIC to invoke XSL files or perform suspicious process creation commands, a technique often used for proxy execution or script-based attacks.
This rule detects the use of 'wmic.exe' with the '/format' switch to execute XSL files, or the direct execution of 'msxsl.exe'. These methods are common techniques used by adversaries to bypass security controls by executing arbitrary scripts embedded within XSL files, often fetched from remote locations or local paths.
Detects WMI-based process execution (T1047) where a script interpreter (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) executes a JavaScript or script file, followed within 30 seconds by WmiPrvSE.exe spawning PowerShell. This reconstructs the broken process chain created when scripts use WbemScripting.SWbemLocator and Win32_Process.Create() to proxy execution through WMI.
Why suspicious: Legitimate use of WMI to spawn interactive shells is rare. This technique is specifically used to sever the parent-child process relationship between the initial script host and PowerShell, evading parent-process-based EDR detections and allowlist rules.
Observed in: Remcos RAT campaigns using VHDX-packaged JavaScript loaders, but the technique is not exclusive to this malware family.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
Why suspicious: Legitimate use of WMI to spawn interactive shells is rare. This technique is specifically used to sever the parent-child process relationship between the initial script host and PowerShell, evading parent-process-based EDR detections and allowlist rules.
Observed in: Remcos RAT campaigns using VHDX-packaged JavaScript loaders, but the technique is not exclusive to this malware family.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
This rule detects the use of 'wmic.exe' with the '/format' switch to execute XSL files, or the direct execution of 'msxsl.exe'. These methods are common techniques used by adversaries to bypass security controls by executing arbitrary scripts embedded within XSL files, often fetched from remote locations or local paths.
Detects WMIC XSL script processing for LOLBin code execution
This rule detects the delivery of a malicious XSL (Extensible Stylesheet Language) script via HTTP to a client. The detection is based on the HTTP URI containing ".xsl" (case-insensitive) and the file data containing "<msxsl:script" (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of an attempt to use XSLT for proxy execution, often associated with techniques like WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for defense evasion.
This rule detects HTTP responses containing XSL Transform with embedded JScript payloads. It specifically looks for the presence of 'language="JScript"' and 'WScript.Shell' within the file data of an HTTP response flowing to the client. This combination indicates an attempt to execute JScript code, potentially for malicious purposes, often associated with defense evasion or initial access techniques.
Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files.
Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc).
It could be an indicator of SquiblyTwo technique, which uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code.
It could be an indicator of SquiblyTwo technique, which uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code.
Msxsl.EXE Execution
Sigma
Detects the execution of the MSXSL utility. This can be used to execute Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files. These files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Detects the execution of the "msxsl" binary with an "http" keyword in the command line. This might indicate a potential remote execution of XSL files.
Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
This analytic identifies the use of `msxsl.exe` initiating a network connection to a non-private IP address. Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner. This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
The analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045) where the service's ImagePath contains suspicious command-line flags ('-c', '-r', '-k') often used with scripting engines, and the ImagePath itself references common scripting or proxy execution binaries such as cscript, mshta, powershell, pwsh, regsvr32, rundll32, or wscript. This combination indicates an attempt to install a service that executes a script or uses a living-off-the-land binary for malicious purposes, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with the `-format` flag, specifically looking for instances where the format specified is not one of the commonly known, legitimate WMIC output formats (e.g., List, htable, mof, xml, csv). Adversaries can abuse this functionality to load and execute malicious XSL (Extensible Stylesheet Language) files, potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. This technique is often referred to as "Squiblytwo" and leverages WMIC to invoke JScript or VBScript embedded within an XSL file.
This package searches endpoint processes for cscript executing a wsf file which has been attributed to the Serpentine#Cloud campaign.
This is a brittle detection narrowly defined to this particular campaign but is nonetheless useful.
This is a brittle detection narrowly defined to this particular campaign but is nonetheless useful.
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