Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

577 detections

Detects the execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag. Attackers often abuse "diskshadow" to execute scripts that delete shadow copies on systems, which can be a defense evasion technique to prevent system recovery. The rule identifies instances where diskshadow.exe is launched with the script execution flag.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0021
Detects the execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag, where the script is located in a potentially suspicious directory such as temporary folders or user application data directories. This behavior is often associated with defense evasion and system recovery inhibition by adversaries.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
1 year ago
1018
Detects attempts to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) using the `reagentc.exe` command-line tool with the `/disable` argument. Disabling WinRE can prevent system recovery and troubleshooting, which is a common tactic used by adversaries to hinder incident response and recovery efforts.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0018
Detects the execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode with a potentially uncommon script extension. This rule requires initial baselining of allowed script extensions to minimize false positives. Adversaries may use Diskshadow.exe, a legitimate Windows utility, to proxy execution of malicious scripts, often as a defense evasion technique.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0013
This rule detects activities associated with the Charon ransomware, including DLL side-loading, process creation patterns, file modifications related to ransom notes and payload artifacts, shadow copy deletion attempts, and service creation for persistence. It also includes SHA1 hashes for known Charon ransomware executables.
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Aamir Muhammad@Aamir
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
3262
Detects attempts to modify Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) ladder logic or firmware. Such modifications can indicate a high-impact attack aimed at disrupting physical processes, damaging equipment, or establishing persistence within the Operational Technology (OT) network.
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R W@shiftyroot
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
2185
Detects attempts to disable windows recovery environment using Reagentc.
ReAgentc.exe is a command-line tool in Windows used to manage the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE).
It allows users to enable, disable, and configure WinRE, which is used for troubleshooting and repairing common boot issues.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
1 year ago
000
Detects the disabling of the 'execInstalledOnly' kernel setting on an ESXi host, a critical security control that prevents the execution of unsigned binaries. This is often followed by a host reboot to apply the change. This TTP is used by threat groups like UNC3944 to prepare the hypervisor for custom ransomware execution.
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R W@shiftyroot
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
22104
Detects the Chaos ransomware encryptor based on unique command-line arguments and embedded strings.
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Aaron Mog@AaronMogS2S
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
1225
Detects a wide range of indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with SafePay ransomware, including specific command lines, persistence mechanisms, defense evasion techniques, and host-based artifacts.
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Chaitanya B B@mralien
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
4649
This detection identifies attempts to delete volume shadow copies using common utilities like vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell. This is a technique frequently used by ransomware before encryption to prevent easy restoration of files.
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Anoozilla HunterX@AnoozillaHunterX
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
2140
Detects the suspicious loading of `vss_ps.dll` by executables that are not typically associated with the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). This DLL is often abused by attackers to delete or manipulate shadow copies, which can hinder forensic investigations and data recovery efforts, commonly seen in ransomware attacks or other destructive operations. The rule filters out known legitimate processes and common program file locations to reduce false positives.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
1 year ago
1038
DEVMAN Ransomware Detection
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alexandre paquette@kramtoux
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
7259
KQL Query
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
2068
KQL Query from file: Hunting Rogue Endpoints via SMB Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
9067
Detects WannaCry ransomware activity
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Detects the addition of new root, CA or AuthRoot certificates to the Windows registry
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0010
Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
Detects a command that accesses the VolumeShadowCopy in order to extract sensitive files such as the Security or SAM registry hives or the AD database (ntds.dit)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by malware or attackers as a destructive way before launching ransomware.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
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