Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
842 detections
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Detects the loading of specific vulnerable drivers ('zam64.sys', 'UpdateCheckerX64.sys') used by ransomware groups like CrazyHunter and Interlock to terminate security products. The query combines multiple data sources to detect different stages of BYOVD activity, including driver file creation, registry entries for service creation, and command-line activity related to driver loading.
Detects when the Windows Service Control Manager (services.exe) spawns a suspicious child process. This can indicate an attacker has configured a service's recovery options to execute a malicious command or script upon service failure.
Detects modifications to the registry values responsible for service recovery actions, specifically the 'FailureCommand' or 'FailureActions' values. This can indicate an attacker is configuring a service to execute a malicious payload upon failure for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of Metasploit's 'getsystem' command, which creates a temporary service that executes a command to echo data into a named pipe. This is a common technique for privilege escalation via named pipe impersonation.
Detects a sequence where a service terminates unexpectedly, followed immediately by a process creation from the Service Control Manager (services.exe). This pattern can indicate that a service's recovery options have been configured to run a malicious program upon failure.
Detects a command-line pattern associated with the Metasploit 'getsystem' command. This technique involves echoing a string into a named pipe to elevate privileges to SYSTEM, often executed via a newly created service.
Detects the execution of an executable named 'svchost.com' from the 'C:\Windows\' directory. This is a known persistence and masquerading technique used by the threat actor MuddyWater. The legitimate Windows process is 'svchost.exe' and is located in the System32 directory.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'BluetoothService' where its executable path points to a non-standard, user-writable location (e.g., AppData, Temp, ProgramData). This technique is often used by malware, such as the Chrysalis backdoor in the Lotus Blossom campaign, to establish persistence and evade detection by masquerading as a legitimate system service.
This rule detects various activities associated with the FoxKitsune malware, including network staging, suspicious file drops in SysWOW64, unusual svchost execution, service persistence, and attempts to tamper with Windows Defender. It correlates these events to identify potential FoxKitsune infections.
Detects the creation of a Windows service followed by the use of "sc.exe sdset" to apply a highly restrictive security descriptor. This specific TTP is used by the REF4033 group (UAT-8099) to harden their malicious 'WalletServiceInfo' service, making it difficult for administrators to stop or delete.
Detects the creation or execution of files, often in C:\ProgramData, with a file description of 'SimpleHelp Remote Access Client' but using non-standard or renamed filenames. This is indicative of threat actors deploying the SimpleHelp RMM tool for persistence, as observed in campaigns exploiting CVE-2026-1731 in BeyondTrust.
Detects the execution of CbsMsgApi.exe, which is the initial loader used by the REF4033 group to install the BADIIS IIS module and create a persistence service. The detection is based on the specific filename or the known imphash of the loader.
This rule detects various activities associated with the ClawdBot campaign, which uses a fake VS Code extension to drop the ScreenConnect RAT. Detection logic includes suspicious network activity fetching malicious payloads (config.json, lightshot files, zoomupdate.msi) from known malicious domains or Dropbox, identification of known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 servers on port 8041, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file dropping/staging in temporary directories, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary paths.
This query utilizes the IOCs provided by Rapid7 and focuses on columns in the DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents tables. This is a high FP query, however each event will require an investigation to its legitimacy. The query accounts for all devices that have installed notepad++ in the past 400d and only looking for IOCs within time of known compromise in order to save on resources. Some IOCs are commented out due to high FP rate.
Detects UserAccountBroker.exe being spawned by explorer.exe, which is an unusual parent-child relationship. The rule is enriched by looking for subsequent outbound network connections from the UserAccountBroker.exe process, a behavior observed in ValleyRAT infections.
Detects the creation or loading of the vulnerable EnCase forensic driver 'OemHwUpd.sys'. This driver is being exploited in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security products.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'ClawdBot' campaign, which involves dropping the ScreenConnect Remote Access Trojan (RAT) via a fake VS Code extension. It identifies suspicious network connections to known malicious domains or Dropbox (when initiated by Code.exe), known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 ports, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file drops in temporary directories related to ScreenConnect or Lightshot, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary folders. It also looks for initial payload downloads from attacker command and control infrastructure.
Detects the creation of a Windows kernel-mode driver service where the driver binary is located in a suspicious, non-standard directory like Temp, Public, or AppData. This is a common persistence technique for malware, including EDR killers that use vulnerable drivers.
Detects the installation of the "Hotta Killer" tool, a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) process killer used by the Interlock ransomware group to terminate security software. This is identified by the creation of a specific kernel driver file (`UpdateCheckerX64.sys`) and a corresponding Windows service with a distinct naming pattern (`UpdateCheckerX64_{random-numbers}`).
Detects the creation or start of a Windows service with a name pattern 'UpdateCheckerX64_{random-numbers}'. This is a characteristic behavior of the 'Hotta Killer' tool used by the Interlock ransomware group to load a vulnerable driver (CVE-2025-61155) for disabling security products.
Detects the Quest Desktop Authority agent service spawning suspicious child processes. This activity could be an indication of exploitation of CVE-2025-67813, where an attacker leverages the 'AdminExec' operation to achieve remote code execution as SYSTEM.
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