Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
486 detections
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Detects process creation of known C2 and tunneling tools associated with INC and The Gentlemen ransomware affiliates, including Sliver, RevSocks, Ghost C2, Athena, QuickLine, and Phantom, by matching image names, original file names, or command-line arguments.
Detects the sequence where a private key file is written to the host followed by the execution of ssh.exe with parameters indicating a reverse port forwarding tunnel (-R), an identity file (-i), and background execution (-N or -f) within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of the Chisel tunneling tool configured as a client building a reverse SOCKS tunnel with flags such as TLS verification disabled, keepalive, or authentication, or communicating with a known C2 endpoint.
Detects the execution of tooling routed through a reverse SOCKS5 pivot via wrappers such as via_socks.sh, proxychains4 with a SOCKS5 configuration, or LD_PRELOAD injection of libproxychains.so.
This detection identifies outbound IPv4 and IPv6 network connections to non-standard ports that may indicate suspicious network activity, unauthorized communication, or potential command-and-control (C2) traffic.
It excludes commonly used ports for DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), and alternate web services (8000, 8080), along with private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and documentation-only IP ranges to reduce noise.
It excludes commonly used ports for DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), and alternate web services (8000, 8080), along with private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and documentation-only IP ranges to reduce noise.
Detects the setting of the TS_SERVE_ALLOW_ALL_INTERFACES environment variable or registry key combined with the execution of Tailscale serve or funnel commands on the same device within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized exposure of local services.
Detects the execution of PaperCut reverse SOCKS5 bridge kit operator-side scripts (such as admin_bridge.py, live_reverse_socks5.py, start_socks.sh) or the creation of related Java bridge class artifacts.
Detects potential abuse of Tailscale SSH Unix socket forwarding where the tailscaled daemon touches sensitive files/sockets (such as docker.sock or /etc/shadow) or creates/replaces Unix sockets following an SSH session.
Detects malicious behaviors involving the Chisel tunneling tool, including reverse SOCKS proxy connections with TLS verification skipped, cron-based persistence referencing watchdog scripts in hidden /var/tmp directories, and associated tool staging activities.
Detects the execution of Tailscale with commands indicating the use of 'serve' or 'funnel' features, potentially establishing unauthorized network tunnels or proxies.
Detects newly seen devices (no Tailscale process activity in the prior 30 days) executing Tailscale enrollment or login commands followed by outbound network connections to Tailscale control infrastructure within 10 minutes, potentially indicating unauthorized VPN tunneling.
Detects potential abuse of Tailscale SSH Unix socket forwarding where the tailscaled daemon touches sensitive files/sockets (such as docker.sock or /etc/shadow) or creates/replaces Unix sockets following an SSH session.
Detects non-root SSH execution performing remote port forwarding (-R) targeting a Unix socket bind on hosts running the tailscaled daemon, excluding known automation tools.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the Blackwood tunneling tool from Blinder Tunnel. Blackwood.dll is sideloaded into a signed vshost32.exe via its .config and reflectively loads Go-compiled Chisel, which dials a raw public IP and opens a reverse SOCKS proxy for lateral pivoting.
Detects the VS Code CLI (code-insiders / code) being used to install a remote tunnel as a service, run from outside normal application install locations (e.g. the Windows debug folder). Keyed on the tunnel service install behavior and unusual location rather than a specific file path, so renamed or relocated copies still match. Abuse enables covert remote access via Microsoft tunnel infrastructure. Rotation test: still fires if the actor changes the directory, flags order or infrastructure, as long as the binary is run with tunnel + service install outside standard paths.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects SSH clients launched with reverse (-R) or dynamic (-D) port
forwarding flags, a hallmark of tunnel establishment used to pivot into internal
networks or expose internal services through a compromised host. The Blinder
Tunnel campaign leverages SSH tunneling to encapsulate C2 and lateral movement
traffic inside an allowed protocol.
forwarding flags, a hallmark of tunnel establishment used to pivot into internal
networks or expose internal services through a compromised host. The Blinder
Tunnel campaign leverages SSH tunneling to encapsulate C2 and lateral movement
traffic inside an allowed protocol.
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