Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Microsoft Excel spawning script hosts or living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) with command line parameters indicative of decoding or executing payloads, commonly associated with malicious macro-enabled .xlsm workbooks.
Detects phishing campaigns leveraging AWS Lambda Function URLs with pre-filled target email parameters used for credential harvesting. The rule correlates email delivery events, URL click events from email protection/safelinks, endpoint network connections to lambda URLs, and cloud app activity referencing these infrastructure endpoints.
Esta detección identifica posibles conexiones relacionadas con el uso de VPNs dentro del entorno corporativo, correlacionando puertos asociados a protocolos VPN, dominios no habituales, procesos iniciadores y adaptadores de red virtuales o tunelizados. El objetivo es descubrir actividad de VPN no autorizada, conexiones cifradas ocultas dentro de tráfico HTTPS y el uso de extensiones de navegador que actúan como túneles tipo VPN.
La lógica de esta consulta aplica múltiples capas de filtrado para reducir falsos positivos:
- Filtra conexiones salientes hacia puertos característicos de IPsec, OpenVPN, WireGuard, L2TP y PPTP.
- Detecta túneles sobre puerto 443 cuando el proceso iniciador no corresponde a aplicaciones del sistema.
- Excluye ruido generado por procesos de Windows y dominios legítimos asociados a Microsoft, Google y servicios cloud corporativos.
- Identifica adaptadores TAP, TUN, Wintun, WireGuard, Tailscale o ZeroTier presentes en el host.
- Clasifica el tipo probable de VPN según el puerto utilizado y el proceso que inicia la conexión.
Esta detección permite encontrar:
- Clientes VPN instalados sin autorización.
- Extensiones de navegador que establecen túneles SSL-VPN encubiertos.
- Herramientas de túneles encubiertos como WireGuard stealth, Tailscale o ZeroTier.
- Actividad anómala desde navegadores que podría indicar proxies cifrados o VPNs embebidas.
La lógica de esta consulta aplica múltiples capas de filtrado para reducir falsos positivos:
- Filtra conexiones salientes hacia puertos característicos de IPsec, OpenVPN, WireGuard, L2TP y PPTP.
- Detecta túneles sobre puerto 443 cuando el proceso iniciador no corresponde a aplicaciones del sistema.
- Excluye ruido generado por procesos de Windows y dominios legítimos asociados a Microsoft, Google y servicios cloud corporativos.
- Identifica adaptadores TAP, TUN, Wintun, WireGuard, Tailscale o ZeroTier presentes en el host.
- Clasifica el tipo probable de VPN según el puerto utilizado y el proceso que inicia la conexión.
Esta detección permite encontrar:
- Clientes VPN instalados sin autorización.
- Extensiones de navegador que establecen túneles SSL-VPN encubiertos.
- Herramientas de túneles encubiertos como WireGuard stealth, Tailscale o ZeroTier.
- Actividad anómala desde navegadores que podría indicar proxies cifrados o VPNs embebidas.
Detects security software discovery behavior by identifying tasklist execution combined with directory listings of the CrowdStrike sensor folder on the same device within a short window, which can serve as a coverage check for hosts lacking the Falcon sensor.
Dual-use transfer tools (rclone, WinSCP, curl, AzCopy, AWS/gcloud CLI) are favored by ransomware affiliates and APT operators because they are signed/legitimate. The hunt keys on upload-oriented flags and verbs per tool, not binary presence. Each tool has its own
Detects the creation or renaming of known vulnerable drivers alongside multiple security-killer executables on a single host within a one-hour window, indicating potential preparation for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks and evasion of security controls.
Detects the disguised binary 'Credential Guard.exe' accessing sensitive browser credential and cookie stores across common browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera), indicative of credential theft activity.
Detects the Cairn dispatcher (or its uv/python launcher) spawning agent worker CLIs (claude, codex, pi) as child processes in local mode.
Detects automated multi-tool reconnaissance where several distinct network or web scanner tools (such as nmap, nikto, ffuf, gobuster, or dirsearch) are launched on the same device within a short time window.
Detects potential JNDI Injection exploitation. Often coupled with Log4Shell exploitation.
Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons
Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level via a script located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon location.
Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
Detects the abuse of the exefile handler in new file association. Used for bypass of security products.
Detects the presence of the compromised anthropic.claude-code VS Code extension version 2.1.313 or its associated bad hash on disk, reverse SSH tunneling spawned by code editors or extension hosts, and network connections to known malicious C2 IP address 134.209.82.225.
The following analytic detects PHP command-line interpreters executing code supplied directly on the command line with the CLI -r / --run options, or code supplied to PHPDBG through standard input.
It covers common CLI executable names on Linux and Windows, including php.exe, php-win.exe, the legacy php-cli.exe name, versioned Linux php binaries, phpdbg, and FrankenPHP's php-cli subcommand.
PHP-CGI and PHP-FPM are excluded because they do not support the PHP CLI inline -r option.
This behavior can be used legitimately for administration and automation, but unexpected or obfuscated inline PHP execution may indicate an attacker using an installed interpreter to run commands without dropping a script file.
It covers common CLI executable names on Linux and Windows, including php.exe, php-win.exe, the legacy php-cli.exe name, versioned Linux php binaries, phpdbg, and FrankenPHP's php-cli subcommand.
PHP-CGI and PHP-FPM are excluded because they do not support the PHP CLI inline -r option.
This behavior can be used legitimately for administration and automation, but unexpected or obfuscated inline PHP execution may indicate an attacker using an installed interpreter to run commands without dropping a script file.
Detects mass creation or renaming of files with the .L0CK3D extension (associated with C3RB3R / eCh0raix ransomware) within a short timeframe across multiple folders, optionally correlated with the creation of the read-me3.txt ransom note.
Detects potential pass-the-hash (PtH) attacks via command-line execution of offensive tooling (such as Impacket, CrackMapExec, NetExec, Evil-WinRM) specifying NT hashes, as well as remote NTLM network logons from non-standard workstation names characteristic of Linux-based attacker tools spreading across multiple endpoints.
Detects a sequence where a ZIP file from known lure repositories or names is downloaded, followed within a day by the execution of a LuaJIT binary (util64.exe or luajit.exe) via a script launcher (Application.bat or Launcher.cmd) using obfuscated text files.
Archiving then sending data out within a short window is a hallmark of exfiltration. Implemented with correlate() over three event sets: archive process → transfer-tool process → that same process's public connection, all on one aid within 2 hours.
With binaries blocked, operators upload using .NET primitives and web cmdlets (WebClient.UploadFile, Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -InFile, FtpWebRequest). Logic is anchored on strong upload indicators, not webclient + URL (which mostly catches download cradles).
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