Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,407 detections

This analytic detects selected processes spawned directly by Windows Remote Management Host processes winrshost.exe and wsmprovhost.exe.
The selected children include shells, scripting hosts, and administrative, discovery, and file-transfer utilities. This target-side process relationship can indicate remote execution, but it can also result from authorized WinRM administration.
Investigate the account, target host, available command line, and surrounding remote-logon activity to determine context.
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Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
19 days ago
008
Detects the installation of a Windows service (Event IDs 4697 or 7045) where the image path executes PowerShell, rundll32, or an ADMIN$ share binary, preceded within 10 minutes by a remote admin share access (Event ID 5140 to ADMIN$ or C$). This behavior is commonly associated with lateral movement frameworks such as Cobalt Strike.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
23 days ago
9021
Detects rundll32.exe being invoked either:
(a) against a file with a non-DLL/non-executable extension (e.g. .jpg, .png, .pdf,
.txt, .ini, .html, .js) followed by an exported function call — a common evasion
where a malicious DLL is renamed to a benign extension to bypass extension-based
filtering, or
(b) from a user-writable staging directory (Temp, AppData, ProgramData, Public,
Downloads) — a broader signal since legitimate rundll32 targets are almost
always shipped under Program Files/System32, not dropped into user-writable
paths at runtime.
Excludes cases where the parent process is msiexec.exe, since MSI custom actions
legitimately spawn rundll32 against .tmp/.dat staging files during installation.
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Pavan Pothamsetti@pepete
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Detections.ai Community
19 days ago
006
Detects the setting of the REGISTERAPPRESTART compatibility layer on an application.
This compatibility layer allows an application to register for restart using the "RegisterApplicationRestart" API.
This can be potentially abused as a persistence mechanism.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
13 days ago
001
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by "SystemResetPlatform.exe" located in a non-default location.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
18 days ago
005
Detects Tor client execution on Windows endpoints, including the tor.exe binary and the Tor client bundled with Brave Browser (Private Window with Tor). Tor can hide command-and-control or exfiltration traffic, and some malware ships or drops a Tor client. To triage, check the parent process, image path, command line and SHA-256 hash, and confirm whether the user is authorized to use Tor.
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Vignesh S@vigneshh
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Detections.ai Community
25 days ago
14033
Detects instances of BTCPay Server running version 2.4.1 or earlier, which contain known vulnerabilities patched in version 2.4.2.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
20 days ago
209
Detects executable files saved to user-writable profile folders (Desktop, Downloads, Documents and similar) on Windows endpoints when the file has no company name in its PE version information. Commercial software almost always carries this field, while malware, masqueraded tools and quick custom builds often do not. Detection relies on file signature rather than extension. Portable utilities and internal tools also match, so triage by hash, writing process, file path and download source.
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Vignesh S@vigneshh
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Detections.ai Community
25 days ago
6032
Detects the execution of shell interpreters (such as cmd, powershell, bash, osascript) as child processes of the Obsidian note-taking application. This behavior was observed in the REF6598 campaign where threat actors abused the "Shell Commands" community plugin to deliver the PHANTOMPULSE RAT. It also detects specific command-line indicators associated with the campaign.
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Luís Marques@remotecodeexecution
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SIBS Cyberwatch
17 days ago
004
Detects WMI queries for installed AntiVirus products executed via scripting interpreters such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or wmic.exe. This behavior may indicate an attempt to gather information about security software on the system, which can be a precursor to evasion or targeted attacks.
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Luís Marques@remotecodeexecution
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SIBS Cyberwatch
17 days ago
004
Detects attempts to identify the domain membership of a system using WMI queries to the Win32_ComputerSystem class. This technique is often employed by attackers to gather information about the network environment and potential targets.
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Luís Marques@remotecodeexecution
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SIBS Cyberwatch
17 days ago
004
Detects attempts to enumerate Active Directory computer objects using the Get-ADComputer cmdlet with wildcard filters. This technique is often employed by attackers to gather information about networked devices and their configurations.
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Luís Marques@remotecodeexecution
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SIBS Cyberwatch
17 days ago
004
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader, including macOS LaunchAgent creation (com.apple.sysmond), Linux cron @reboot persistence using hidden config files (.smt), Windows scheduled tasks (SysMon SYSTEM task), and SSH authorized keys manipulation.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
23 days ago
8019
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate issuance events (Event ID 4887) where the user requesting the certificate differs from the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) identity supplied in the request. This behavior is indicative of ESC1-style AD CS privilege escalation abuse, where a user requests a certificate on behalf of another privileged user.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
19 days ago
106
Detects the execution of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools shortly after either Microsoft Teams activity or a surge of inbound emails (email bombing) targeting the same user, a common precursor pattern used by threat actors for social engineering and initial access.
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Andry R@madadrix261
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Detections.ai Community
26 days ago
26240
Detects a camera management software binary (e.g. iVMS-4200,
SmartPSS, NVR/DVR viewers, vendor CMS/VMS clients) spawning cmd.exe,
powershell.exe or pwsh.exe. In this campaign the compromised vendor update
channel abused the trusted, signed vendor executable to proxy execution of
follow-on payloads and shell commands, inheriting the vendor signature to
evade application allowlisting and static detection.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
23 days ago
3017
Detects DLL files written to user-writable profile folders (Desktop, Downloads, Documents and similar) on Windows endpoints. Attackers use these folders to stage a malicious DLL next to a legitimate executable, often from a phishing archive, so the executable loads it via DLL side-loading. Events are grouped by endpoint and path with DLL names, vendor, SHA-256 and the writing process. Installers and portable apps also match, so triage by hash, vendor, writing process and download source.
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Vignesh S@vigneshh
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Detections.ai Community
25 days ago
9027
Detects processes (excluding common legitimate ones like browsers or backup tools) that access sensitive local data such as iPhone MobileSync backups or Slack workspace storage, while simultaneously initiating network connections to roblox.com.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
17 days ago
003
Detects a sequence where an unsigned or untrusted kernel driver is loaded from a user-writable path (potentially indicating a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver / BYOVD pattern), followed by a security tampering attempt or antivirus tamper event on the same device within a 30-minute window.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
17 days ago
003
Detects potential remote code execution, web shell activity, and post-exploitation behaviors originating from PHP worker processes on internet-facing hosts, referencing patterns associated with php2shell vulnerabilities. PHP-UP-2026
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Aamir Muhammad@Aamir
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
4496680
Detects changes to the PSFactory COM InProcServer32 registry. This technique was used by RomCom to create persistence storing a malicious DLL.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
11 days ago
000
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