Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Detects Vidar Stealer v2.x-3.x custom VM bytecode interpreter used to deobfuscate strings via a fetch-decode-execute loop with sparse opcode dispatch and single accumulator
Detects Vidar's custom stream cipher used for string/config decryption: FNV-1a mixing of the VM-derived key combined with golden-ratio nonce mixing and per-build ARX round constants
Detects the presence of the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package, which contains a backdoor that hooks 'BTree.prototype.set' to execute 'sharedLoad.min.js' at runtime. The rule monitors for characteristic file paths, function hooking patterns, and node process spawning behavior designed to evade installation-time static analysis.
Detects creation of a token.cmd file in AppData followed by its execution via cmd.exe within a 5-minute window.
Detects creation of a token.cmd file in AppData followed by its execution via cmd.exe within a 5-minute window.
Detects unauthorized outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) utilizing hardcoded credentials, specific chat IDs, or standard Bot API communication patterns (sendMessage/sendDocument) which are often used by malware for data exfiltration and command-and-control communication.
Detects network traffic associated with the NPM Btree malware campaign, specifically identifying command-and-control (C2) polling activities directed toward blockchain RPC endpoints like Alchemy and Infura. The rules monitor for specific API keys, C2 smart contract addresses via 'eth_call' JSON-RPC requests, and overall traffic patterns to known malicious infrastructure.
Detects a process that deletes its own executable or script file within a short time window after launch, which is a technique used by some implants.
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