Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The attacker then overlays fake intrusive elements (e.g. cookie banners, popups, or CAPTCHA) so that the user’s clicks fall on the hidden password manager controls, resulting in completing the forms with sensitive information.
This rule monitors for the mounting of USB drives on a specific device. It aims to detect unauthorized data exfiltration attempts, audit physical device access, investigate insider threats or policy violations, and track removable media usage for compliance purposes.
This Logic detects the presence of the malicious Chrome extension FreeVPN.One by identifying its unique extension ID across installed browsers. The logic further correlates this presence with network communications initiated by the extension to suspicious or untrusted domains. By combining extension enumeration with traffic analysis, the detection ensures high fidelity with minimal false positives. This layered approach strengthens visibility into malicious browser add-ons masquerading as VPN tools.
This rule detects communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with known malicious MD5 or SHA256 hashes. It correlates threat intelligence with network and endpoint telemetry to identify compromised devices or accounts.
Hunts for abuse of Microsoft 365’s Direct Send feature where attackers send spoofed emails appearing internal, bypassing filters. Includes detection of suspicious DNS queries, outbound network connections, and PowerShell abuse for insider misuse.
This detection rule identifies suspicious logins by service accounts on devices they haven't accessed in the last 14 days. This behavior could indicate a compromised service account being used for lateral movement within the environment. Service accounts typically have a static set of devices they authenticate to, making deviations easier to spot compared to user accounts. However, some service accounts (e.g., MDI service accounts) are known to dynamically log into devices, which may require environment-specific fine-tuning to reduce false positives.
This KQL query detects suspicious service activities (installation, modification, or deletion) by comparing events with a curated list of known suspicious Windows services. It extracts service names and accounts from device events and joins them with an external CSV list of suspicious services to identify matches. The query aims to alert on the presence or manipulation of services commonly associated with malicious activity.
This KQL rule detects commands executed via the Run dialog by monitoring changes to the "Runmru" registry key. This key stores a history of commands entered into the Run dialog. Attackers or malicious scripts often use this method to launch tools like PowerShell, cmd, or malicious payloads, particularly in social engineering attacks where users are tricked into running commands.
This rule identifies potentially suspicious signed binaries by looking for files with digital signatures from signers that are not commonly known or trusted vendors. It aims to detect the abuse of code signing certificates by threat actors to bypass security controls, leveraging the trust associated with digital signatures. The rule explicitly excludes a list of well-known and trusted software vendors to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the presence of potentially malicious or unwanted browser extensions and outbound network connections to known adware or tracking domains. It correlates extension presence with network behavior to identify threats.
Detects potential GTFOBins abuse on Linux systems where a root shell is spawned by a suspicious parent process (e.g., find, perl, vim, tar, etc.).
This rule relies on DeviceProcessEvents in Microsoft Defender XDR and is intended for environments where Auditd, Sysmon for Linux, or similar native logging is not available.
Note: This detection does not cover all GTFOBins. It focuses specifically on cases where:
- A root-owned shell is spawned
- The parent process is known to be capable of shell escape or privilege abuse
- The child command appears interactive or escape-like
It does not detect:
- Non-shell-based GTFOBin techniques (e.g., file exfiltration via scp, curl, etc.)
- GTFOBin usage that doesn't result in a new shell (e.g., privilege escalation via
misconfigured capabilities)
- Abuse of GTFOBins run under non-root accounts
The query includes logic to detect both high-signal exploitation patterns and suspicious shell spawns, while excluding common false positives (e.g., package post-install scripts and benign environment checks).
This rule relies on DeviceProcessEvents in Microsoft Defender XDR and is intended for environments where Auditd, Sysmon for Linux, or similar native logging is not available.
Note: This detection does not cover all GTFOBins. It focuses specifically on cases where:
- A root-owned shell is spawned
- The parent process is known to be capable of shell escape or privilege abuse
- The child command appears interactive or escape-like
It does not detect:
- Non-shell-based GTFOBin techniques (e.g., file exfiltration via scp, curl, etc.)
- GTFOBin usage that doesn't result in a new shell (e.g., privilege escalation via
misconfigured capabilities)
- Abuse of GTFOBins run under non-root accounts
The query includes logic to detect both high-signal exploitation patterns and suspicious shell spawns, while excluding common false positives (e.g., package post-install scripts and benign environment checks).
This rule detects PowerShell command line execution by user accounts. It specifically looks for `PowerShellCommand` events where the `InitiatingProcessFileName` is `powershell.exe` and the `InitiatingProcessAccountName` is not 'system'. It also ensures that both `ProcessCommandLine` and `InitiatingProcessCommandLine` are not empty. This helps monitor PowerShell usage across endpoints, detect suspicious or unauthorized script execution, and investigate potential lateral movement or remote access.
Hackers steal Microsoft logins using legitimate ADFS redirects
This rule detects the installation of potentially unwanted or suspicious applications, specifically looking for a sponsored version of FileZilla. It then correlates this installation with outbound network activity to public IP addresses, which could indicate telemetry, beaconing, data exfiltration, or command and control (C2) behavior.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity, specifically file downloads using 'curl' initiated by a web browser. This behavior may indicate malicious JavaScript or HTML triggering command execution, a user being tricked into clicking a link that launches a command, or initial access/payload download in a phishing or drive-by attack.
This rule detects PRT token stealing on a device when exploiting the MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll, leveraging a WDAC audit policy to ingest missing Microsoft Defender for Endpoint events. This addresses a blind spot in default Defender for Endpoint detection.
Detects suspicious downloads or fetches of common privilege-escalation tools such as winPEAS, linPEAS, PowerUp, Seatbelt, SharpUp, WinPwn, PrivescCheck, Sherlock, Watson, BeRoot, LinEnum, LSE/LES, Linux Exploit Suggester, pspy, or GTFObins. These tools are often used by adversaries after initial access to enumerate the environment and attempt local privilege escalation.
This rule identifies devices that are missing recommended security updates based on data from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's TVM (Threat and Vulnerability Management) capabilities. It joins vulnerability information with knowledge base articles to pinpoint specific missing updates.
This rule identifies potentially suspicious signed binaries in the environment by looking for files signed by 'OneStart Technologies LLC' and excluding common, known good vendors. This helps detect the abuse of code signing certificates by threat actors to bypass security controls and can support threat hunting and malware analysis.
This rule detects potential obfuscated or stealthy PowerShell execution by identifying PowerShell commands that do not use the default 'powershell' or 'pwsh' executable names but still contain common PowerShell command-line arguments such as '-NoProfile', '-ExecutionPolicy', or 'Invoke-Expression'. It correlates these executions with user logon sessions to aid in attribution and threat hunting.
This rule detects attempts to exploit known CVEs on the network where the targeted device is identified as vulnerable to that specific CVE. It correlates network inspection signatures with vulnerability management data to identify high-confidence exploitation attempts.
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