Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects unauthorized attempts to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus features using the Set-MpPreference PowerShell cmdlet. By monitoring the command line arguments for multiple disable flags (such as -DisableRealtimeMonitoring, -DisableBehaviorMonitoring, etc.), the rule flags activity where an attacker or unauthorized user is attempting to impair host-based security defenses.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage 'Invoke-Expression' (IEX) in conjunction with 'Net.WebClient' or 'DownloadString' methods to download and execute code directly from the internet into memory.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate file transfers, specifically targeting non-Microsoft signed processes. Adversaries often abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to download malicious payloads or exfiltrate data, as it is a legitimate Windows service that operates in the background.
Hunts for PowerShell commands setting up the RijndaelManaged API in ECB mode, a cryptographic pattern used by AsyncRAT for C2 packet encryption.
Detects the initialization sequence of the Millenium RAT, which attempts to weaken host security by adding the entire C:\ drive as an exclusion path for Windows Defender using the Add-MpPreference PowerShell cmdlet.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell command sequence involving network downloads to temporary directories followed by the execution of a Node.js binary from within the user's AppData directory within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a dropper pattern where a malicious script retrieves and executes a secondary stage payload.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell processes. This is achieved by monitoring command-line arguments for keywords associated with memory patching or reflection techniques, such as modifying AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiUtils, or interacting with amsi.dll to neutralize security scanning.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell processes. This is achieved by monitoring command-line arguments for keywords associated with memory patching or reflection techniques, such as modifying AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiUtils, or interacting with amsi.dll to neutralize security scanning.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell or Command Prompt to execute commands related to Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software or remote management tools such as IDrive or TeamViewer. It specifically looks for command-line arguments involving RMM-related keywords combined with execution flags or piping operators, which is a common pattern for automating the deployment, configuration, or malicious use of these remote access tools.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by searching for common memory patching techniques, such as modifying AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or related reflection-based obfuscation in process command lines.
Detects the creation of WMI event subscriptions, including event filters, consumers, and bindings, performed by wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This activity is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution via the Windows Management Instrumentation service.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that utilize Base64 encoded commands combined with memory-execution primitives such as Invoke-Expression (IEX) or DownloadString. The rule specifically flags commands longer than 100 characters to reduce noise from short administrative tasks.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, powershell, wbadmin) to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to prevent system recovery.
Detects instances of PowerShell being launched directly by explorer.exe. This activity is a known indicator of 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering campaigns, where users are instructed by a deceptive website or lure to copy and paste malicious PowerShell commands into the Windows Run dialog or the File Explorer address bar to execute code.
Identifies instances where a user account established an interactive logon session from a known RedVDS IP address and subsequently executed PowerShell commands containing download patterns (Net.WebClient or DownloadString), indicative of secondary payload retrieval.
This rule detects attempts to disable Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring or behavior monitoring features using PowerShell. It specifically looks for `powershell.exe` executing `Set-MpPreference` with the `-DisableRealtimeMonitoring` or `-DisableBehaviorMonitoring` parameters set to `1`, `$true`, or `True`.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands or script blocks that contain specific de-obfuscation patterns associated with the ErrTraffic/ClickFix malware. It looks for the presence of '-bxor' and '[convert]::ToInt32' within PowerShell command lines or script blocks, indicating an attempt to decode obfuscated content.
This rule detects various reconnaissance techniques commonly used to identify network resources, including the execution of SoftPerfect Network Scanner (or renamed binaries), the creation of 'delete.me' files used by SoftPerfect to probe share permissions, the usage of the 'Invoke-ShareFinder' PowerShell script, and the enumeration of network shares using 'net.exe' initiated from PowerShell.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to extract credentials from the Veeam Backup and Replication PostgreSQL database. It identifies malicious activity involving the use of PowerShell to interact with the database, including direct psql.exe command line execution, PowerShell scripts referencing sensitive database keywords, WMI-spawned PowerShell processes, and network connections to the PostgreSQL service port (5432).
Detects unauthorized access to the Veeam Backup PostgreSQL database to extract credentials, a technique observed in Akira ransomware campaigns. The rule monitors for suspicious execution of psql.exe or PowerShell scripts designed to query the 'VeeamBackup' database for credentials, which are subsequently decrypted using DPAPI.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry manipulation. Adversaries often modify these exclusions to hide malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning, a technique used to impair defensive security tools.
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