Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects various techniques used to escape from Linux container isolation, including accessing container daemon control sockets (Docker/containerd), abusing namespace operations (nsenter/setns), mounting sensitive host filesystem paths (e.g., /proc/1/root), performing chroot escapes, and abusing privileged capabilities or socket-based execution.
Detects suspicious process activity or file access patterns originating from within a container that indicate an attempt to escape to the host. This includes monitoring for the use of tools like nsenter, unshare, and mount, attempts to interact with the docker.sock, or attempts to access critical host paths like /proc/1/root or /host/etc, excluding events originating from authorized container management processes.
Detects anomalous process execution originating from a Python-based sandbox (such as Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin in Azure Container Apps) that attempts to break out of the container isolation. The rule monitors for command-line arguments involving interaction with the Docker socket, sensitive host namespaces, or container privilege escalation techniques, indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-25592.
Detects host-side indicators of potential container escapes and unauthorized access, including mounting sensitive container runtime sockets, executing containers with privileged flags, host namespace sharing, and the use of nsenter to break out of a container context.
Detects attempts by AI agent code-interpreter or sandbox processes to break out of their containerized environment. The rule monitors for the execution of common container escape techniques, such as namespace manipulation (nsenter, unshare), mounting host filesystems, accessing sensitive host devices like /dev/kmsg or /dev/mem, or referencing host-level paths from within an isolated AI agent execution process.
Detects a sequence of events where a process within a container namespace attempts to interact with the host filesystem (e.g., /proc/1/root, nsenter) followed shortly by an unexpected gain of root privileges or execution of setuid(0) that is not associated with legitimate su or sudo usage.
Detects command-line activity indicating an attempt to interact with or abuse the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) for container escape. Such activity is often observed in post-compromise scenarios, such as ransomware attacks where an adversary attempts to break out of a containerized application to gain control of the underlying host.
Detects a sequence of events where a process within a container namespace attempts to interact with the host filesystem (e.g., /proc/1/root, nsenter) followed shortly by an unexpected gain of root privileges or execution of setuid(0) that is not associated with legitimate su or sudo usage.
Detects a sequence of events where a process within a container namespace attempts to interact with the host filesystem (e.g., /proc/1/root, nsenter) followed shortly by an unexpected gain of root privileges or execution of setuid(0) that is not associated with legitimate su or sudo usage.
Detects a sequence of events where a process within a container namespace attempts to interact with the host filesystem (e.g., /proc/1/root, nsenter) followed shortly by an unexpected gain of root privileges or execution of setuid(0) that is not associated with legitimate su or sudo usage.
Detects a sequence of events where a process within a container namespace attempts to interact with the host filesystem (e.g., /proc/1/root, nsenter) followed shortly by an unexpected gain of root privileges or execution of setuid(0) that is not associated with legitimate su or sudo usage.
Detects process activity referencing GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or Azure DevOps pipeline environment variable names (GITHUB_*, CI_*, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, Azure DevOps pipeline variables) consistent with a malicious extension harvesting CI/CD runner environment variables.
Detects a Node or Bun process reading Kubernetes service account tokens or HashiCorp Vault
token files. The keyv/cacheable collector reads these paths directly as part of its credential
sweep. Companion rule to the IMDS detection (d02b7df0-60e3-4ec9-a077-339507299e11).
token files. The keyv/cacheable collector reads these paths directly as part of its credential
sweep. Companion rule to the IMDS detection (d02b7df0-60e3-4ec9-a077-339507299e11).
Detects Python worker processes (e.g., dataset converters) spawning suspicious child processes (shells, network tools) or accessing sensitive filesystem paths/endpoints, such as Kubernetes service account tokens or cloud instance metadata, which are often indicative of post-exploitation activity following an SSTI or code injection vulnerability.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
This rule detects two distinct malicious activities related to Gitea installations: 1) Container escape attempts involving 'act-runner' processes configured with dangerous flags like --pid=host, --cap-add=ALL, or usage of nsenter, and 2) Potential administrative impersonation attempts against a Gitea instance via injection of the X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin HTTP header.
This rule detects potential container escape attempts on Linux systems by monitoring suspicious file system access patterns to the host's root directory or process creation events involving 'mount', 'nsenter', or 'chroot' commands with parameters indicative of host interaction. Specifically, it looks for file operations on '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1/cwd', '/proc/1/exe', '/proc/1/fd', '/proc/1/ns', '/proc/1/environ', '/proc/1/mounts' or paths starting with '/host', '/hostroot', '/host-root', '/node-root'. It also flags 'mount' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1', 'nsenter', '--target 1', 'hostpath', or '/host', 'nsenter' commands with namespace manipulation arguments, and 'chroot' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/host', or '/hostroot'. These activities are commonly associated with adversaries trying to break out of a containerized environment to gain access to the underlying host.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
This rule detects potential container escape attempts on Linux systems by monitoring suspicious file system access patterns to the host's root directory or process creation events involving 'mount', 'nsenter', or 'chroot' commands with parameters indicative of host interaction. Specifically, it looks for file operations on '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1/cwd', '/proc/1/exe', '/proc/1/fd', '/proc/1/ns', '/proc/1/environ', '/proc/1/mounts' or paths starting with '/host', '/hostroot', '/host-root', '/node-root'. It also flags 'mount' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1', 'nsenter', '--target 1', 'hostpath', or '/host', 'nsenter' commands with namespace manipulation arguments, and 'chroot' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/host', or '/hostroot'. These activities are commonly associated with adversaries trying to break out of a containerized environment to gain access to the underlying host.
Kubernetes Service Account Token Theft
Cortex XDR
Detects non-legitimate processes attempting to read Kubernetes service account tokens or related sensitive files (ca.crt, namespace) from the standard service account path within containers. This rule filters out common and legitimate Kubernetes system processes to reduce false positives.
etects the full TeamPCP lateral movement pattern: listing secrets across namespaces followed by privileged alpine pod creation in kube-system. Correlation rule.
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