Collin Lairamore
@BollinmoreTrusted contributorCompletionist
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63 detections
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Detects OAuth applications receiving permissions to the tenant, used for persistence and data theft. A consented app holds its own token and survives password resets and MFA, which is why consent phishing and post-compromise app registration are favored by both commodity BEC actors and nation-state (PerfectData is linked to Midnight Blizzard / APT29). Tiered: a hardcoded list of known-abused app IDs (PerfectData, eM Client, rclone, Supermailer, and others), layered over a scope-characteristic tier that catches bespoke apps by the permissions they request (Mail/EWS, Files/Sites, Directory, Application, offline_access), with admin/AllPrincipals consent escalating blast radius. Parses all three consent event shapes and resolves app identity across them.
Suspicious Inbox Rule Creation
Cortex XDR
Detects creation of malicious Exchange Online inbox rules used for BEC and account-takeover persistence. Normalizes both client logging paths, OWA (New-InboxRule) and Outlook desktop (UpdateInboxRules + AddMailboxRule), and flags rules with hidden names (., ,, blank, 1 to 2 chars), external forwarding, or move/delete actions paired with payment (ach, wire, invoice) or security-notification (password, MFA, Microsoft) keywords, especially with stop-processing/exit-after-execution set.
Detects in-process LDAP enumeration of Active Directory through the .NET System.DirectoryServices classes, the [adsisearcher] type accelerator and DirectorySearcher, captured from PowerShell ScriptBlock logging in action_evtlog_message. Severity is assigned from the LDAP filter and requested attributes. CRITICAL covers queries after credential-bearing attributes (LAPS, gMSA, sIDHistory, GPP/SYSVOL paths) or DCSync replication rights. HIGH covers known attack-technique targeting: Tier Zero enumeration via adminCount, SPN enumeration for Kerberoasting, delegation attributes, and the UAC bitmask filters used for AS-REP roasting and unconstrained delegation. MEDIUM covers broad estate enumeration across groups, computers, GPOs, and OUs. Command-line context (suspicious parent process, encoded or hidden execution) is surfaced as separate fields for triage rather than folded into the score.
Detects privileged Active Directory enumeration seen on the wire by Corelight, filtered to source hosts that don't appear in the Cortex endpoint inventory. It reads ldap_search records from corelight_zeek_raw, tiers them by the LDAP filter (CRITICAL for credential-attribute and DCSync hunting, HIGH for Tier Zero, Kerberoast, delegation, and UAC-bitmask targeting, MEDIUM for broad group, computer, and GPO enumeration), then joins the source address against endpoints and keeps only the queries whose id_orig_h has no matching managed agent
This rule monitors Kerberos TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) requests for suspicious patterns indicative of Kerberoasting, specifically looking for the use of weak encryption algorithms (RC4 or DES) and high volumes of service ticket requests for unique Service Principal Names (SPNs). It groups activity by source host and time window, flagging activity that involves DES encryption or a significant number of unique SPN requests. Great for detecting kerberoasting activity from unmanaged or rogue devices
Detects privileged Active Directory enumeration seen on the wire by Corelight, filtered to source hosts that don't appear in the Cortex endpoint inventory. It reads ldap_search records from corelight_zeek_raw, tiers them by the LDAP filter (CRITICAL for credential-attribute and DCSync hunting, HIGH for Tier Zero, Kerberoast, delegation, and UAC-bitmask targeting, MEDIUM for broad group, computer, and GPO enumeration), then joins the source address against endpoints and keeps only the queries whose id_orig_h has no matching managed agent
This rule monitors Kerberos TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) requests for suspicious patterns indicative of Kerberoasting, specifically looking for the use of weak encryption algorithms (RC4 or DES) and high volumes of service ticket requests for unique Service Principal Names (SPNs). It groups activity by source host and time window, flagging activity that involves DES encryption or a significant number of unique SPN requests. Great for detecting kerberoasting activity from unmanaged or rogue devices
Suspicious Inbox Rule Creation
Cortex XDR
Detects creation of malicious Exchange Online inbox rules used for BEC and account-takeover persistence. Normalizes both client logging paths, OWA (New-InboxRule) and Outlook desktop (UpdateInboxRules + AddMailboxRule), and flags rules with hidden names (., ,, blank, 1 to 2 chars), external forwarding, or move/delete actions paired with payment (ach, wire, invoice) or security-notification (password, MFA, Microsoft) keywords, especially with stop-processing/exit-after-execution set.
Detects in-process LDAP enumeration of Active Directory through the .NET System.DirectoryServices classes, the [adsisearcher] type accelerator and DirectorySearcher, captured from PowerShell ScriptBlock logging in action_evtlog_message. Severity is assigned from the LDAP filter and requested attributes. CRITICAL covers queries after credential-bearing attributes (LAPS, gMSA, sIDHistory, GPP/SYSVOL paths) or DCSync replication rights. HIGH covers known attack-technique targeting: Tier Zero enumeration via adminCount, SPN enumeration for Kerberoasting, delegation attributes, and the UAC bitmask filters used for AS-REP roasting and unconstrained delegation. MEDIUM covers broad estate enumeration across groups, computers, GPOs, and OUs. Command-line context (suspicious parent process, encoded or hidden execution) is surfaced as separate fields for triage rather than folded into the score.
Detects process execution events involving database-related commands that may indicate credential tampering or illicit database backups, often associated with database credential theft or exfiltration attempts.
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