Collin Lairamore
@BollinmoreTrusted contributorCompletionist
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63 detections
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SYSVOL / NETLOGON Enumeration
Cortex XDR
Every authenticated principal in the domain can read SYSVOL, and SYSVOL routinely stores logon scripts, scheduled-task XML, and GPP files that contain plaintext or reversibly-encrypted credentials. Adversaries recursively enumerate SYSVOL to harvest these — either grepping file contents (Select-String 'password') or matching file names (dir *password*). This rule detects the read-access footprint of that enumeration on the DC itself, independent of the tool or command line used, by counting distinct SYSVOL paths accessed by a single non-machine account in a short window. Default threshold is 100, change to a high volume for your environment
SYSVOL / NETLOGON Enumeration
Cortex XDR
Every authenticated principal in the domain can read SYSVOL, and SYSVOL routinely stores logon scripts, scheduled-task XML, and GPP files that contain plaintext or reversibly-encrypted credentials. Adversaries recursively enumerate SYSVOL to harvest these — either grepping file contents (Select-String 'password') or matching file names (dir *password*). This rule detects the read-access footprint of that enumeration on the DC itself, independent of the tool or command line used, by counting distinct SYSVOL paths accessed by a single non-machine account in a short window. Default threshold is 100, change to a high volume for your environment
Detects process execution events involving database-related commands that may indicate credential tampering or illicit database backups, often associated with database credential theft or exfiltration attempts.
Detects high-frequency outbound HTTP traffic matching specific URI patterns associated with potential Adaptix C2 beaconing behavior. The rule uses a sliding window threshold (10 requests within 600 seconds) to identify repetitive check-in patterns, which is a common characteristic of malware command-and-control channels.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity related to the NodeSnake RAT. It specifically identifies cleartext HTTP requests attempting to initiate a WebSocket upgrade (using the Sec-WebSocket-Key header) while the target host is specified as an IP address literal rather than a domain name, which is a common indicator of hardcoded or non-DNS-dependent C2 infrastructure.
This rule monitors DNS queries for the domain 'veyko-service.org', which is identified as being associated with the NodeSnake RAT (Remote Access Trojan). The detection indicates potential command-and-control (C2) activity where an infected host attempts to reach a malicious infrastructure domain.
This rule detects the initial WebSocket handshake request used by the INTERLOCK NodeSnake RAT for beaconing. It looks for a GET request containing a 'Sec-WebSocket-Key' header and a specific URI pattern (?v=n;) common to the RAT's communication profile.
This rule detects DNS queries for the domain 'xoredo-srv.com', which is associated with the INTERLOCK NodeSnake RAT for command and control communications.
This rule detects a specific WebSocket handshake pattern associated with the NodeSnake RAT. It specifically identifies an HTTP GET request containing a 'Sec-WebSocket-Key' header and a specific URI query parameter '?v=4|3b|', which indicates beaconing activity characteristic of this RAT's communication channel.
This rule detects DNS queries for the domain 'terezo-kb.org', which is associated with the NodeSnake Remote Access Trojan (RAT), often utilized by the INTERLOCK ransomware group for command and control (C2) communication.
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