Emiliano Mema
@NosalvaGreeceTrusted contributorCompletionist
0 followers634 downloads589 copies6 likes1,947 views
282 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
159
62
43
18
Categories
95
52
49
34
29
Platforms
156
52
34
25
17
Products / Services
74
55
40
40
19
MITRE Techniques
81
76
34
31
22
CVEs
2
2
1
IDS Classtypes
22
14
4
3
IDS Protocols
22
9
5
5
1
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task where the action involves executing pythonw.exe with a specific script named 'ss.py'. This rule specifically looks for task registration events (Event ID 4698) where the action command line contains both 'pythonw.exe' and 'ss.py', while excluding tasks created by 'schtasks.exe' to focus on non-standard creation methods often used by malware or living-off-the-land techniques to register persistence via the COM interface.
Detects anomalous behavior by pythonw.exe where it interacts with screen locker assets or loads specific DLLs from non-standard locations, indicative of a PhishLocker-style fake lock screen being deployed to capture user credentials.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known SynkLoader C2 domains or URI patterns, characterized by 'application/octet-stream' Content-Type headers. The rule targets specific hardcoded domains used by the malware and a suspicious nested URI path pattern commonly associated with its beaconing behavior.
Detects the use of a modified 'msvcp160.dll' associated with SynkLoader, specifically identifying exports related to manual DLL mapping ('ManualMapDLL', 'ManualResolveExport') and the accompanying Python loader script that utilizes 'ctypes.WinDLL' to perform in-memory execution.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the 'build-script-build' executable, which is the compiled output of a Rust 'build.rs' script. While legitimate build scripts may fetch dependencies, unexpected network activity from this process could indicate malicious code injection during the build process, such as a software supply chain attack attempting to download secondary payloads.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where wscript.exe is used to run a file named 'rust-setup-launch.vbs' from a temporary directory, which subsequently triggers powershell.exe to execute a script named 'rust-setup.ps1'. This behavior is indicative of a staged supply chain attack.
Detects the loading of the msaRAT 'lib.dll' malicious module into Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser processes. This DLL is used to facilitate encrypted C2 communication, specifically performing ECDH key exchange and ChaCha-Poly1305 encryption on top of WebRTC DataChannel traffic.
Detects network traffic patterns associated with the msaRAT remote access trojan, specifically identifying suspicious WebRTC DataChannel creation, binary data handling, and custom window messaging bindings used for command-and-control communication.
This rule detects activities associated with the C2Looper v2 backdoor, which achieves persistence and code execution by sideloading a malicious wtsapi32.dll into the OneDrive process. It also identifies subsequent beaconing behavior where the compromised OneDrive process communicates with GitHub-hosted infrastructure to exchange command and control state files (cmd.json, result.json, beacon.json) instead of using traditional dedicated C2 servers.
Detects DLL search-order hijacking by monitoring for the execution of 'consent.exe' from non-standard directories (e.g., user-writable paths like %TEMP% or %APPDATA%) alongside the loading of specific DLLs (msimg32.dll, version.dll) from that same non-standard directory, which is indicative of malicious side-loading activity observed in Bumblebee and Akira intrusion campaigns.
Page 11 of 29