Emiliano Mema
@NosalvaGreeceTrusted contributorCompletionist
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282 detections
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This rule monitors for suspicious activity involving the OneDrive directory, specifically the file 'wtsapi32.dll'. It triggers when this DLL file is created, modified, or renamed within the OneDrive folder, followed by the termination of the OneDrive process, and subsequent loading of the same DLL file by that process. This pattern is indicative of a DLL side-loading attack where a legitimate application (OneDrive) is used to load a malicious DLL.
Detects the creation of domain user accounts using the native 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' utilities with command-line arguments that include '/add', '/dom', and naming conventions indicating 'backup_DA' or 'backup_EA'. This pattern is often associated with adversary attempts to establish persistence or backdoors using privileged service-like account names.
Detects the installation or creation of a Windows service related to RustDesk, a remote access software application. This may indicate unauthorized installation or persistence setup of remote control tools by an adversary.
Detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to interact with administrator accounts, specifically looking for attempts to hardcode passwords in the command line or enabling/modifying domain accounts. This is a common pattern for local account persistence, privilege escalation, or lateral movement.
Detects rapid execution of multiple system discovery commands (systeminfo, nltest, whoami, quser, ping) within a 15-minute window on a single host. Attackers often use these tools sequentially to gather intelligence about the environment, user identity, and network topography post-compromise.
Detects the presence of the msaRAT MSI dropper (update_ms.msi) and its associated embedded payload (lib.dll), identified by the 'RUN' export and specific msa* string bindings used for inter-process communication or internal functionality.
This rule detects potential Bumblebee loader activity by identifying files named 'msimg32.dll' that possess specific known builder file versions and exhibit anomalous, dictionary-derived 'gibberish' entries within their PE version information metadata fields (Comments, CompanyName, or FileDescription).
Detects the execution or installation of the cloudflared utility via PowerShell, which is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or remote access tunnels (Cloudflare Tunnel). The rule triggers on process command lines involving 'cloudflared' and '1.ps1' keywords commonly associated with scripted deployment.
Detects instances where the Windows spooler driver (winspool.drv) is loaded by a process that subsequently performs suspicious memory operations typical of process injection (e.g., CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, WriteToProcessMemory, ProcessInjection) within a 5-minute window.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows consent.exe process loads the library 'msimg32.dll' from a non-standard system directory, specifically targeting suspicious paths such as user-writable AppData or application installation folders. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where an attacker places a malicious DLL with the same name as a legitimate library to achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the trusted consent.exe process.
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