Emiliano Mema
@NosalvaGreeceTrusted contributorCompletionist
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282 detections
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Detects the installation of RustDesk or Cloudflared as a persistent Windows service, initiated by a PowerShell script. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized use of remote access or tunneling tools, often observed in intrusion activity such as Bumblebee, AdaptixC2, or Akira ransomware to facilitate persistence and establish reverse tunnels through firewalls.
Detects instances of DLL side-loading where common application helper binaries (ClaudeDesktop.exe or JetBrains) load libcef.dll from untrusted, user-writable directories such as Downloads, Temp, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of the Claude FakeAgent campaign, which leverages side-loading for payload deployment.
Detects the suspicious execution of a file named 'Windowsupdate.exe' located in 'AppData\Local' that is invoked via a command containing 'copy' and '/b'. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to copy or stitch binary files using a masqueraded system process name to evade detection.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency inbound TCP connection attempts to port 102 (S7comm), which is used by Siemens S7 PLCs. This behavior is indicative of automated network scanning or reconnaissance targeting industrial control system (ICS) infrastructure.
Detects the abuse of the Windows ftp.exe utility to execute a local script file provided via the -s flag. Adversaries may leverage this behavior, often triggered by malicious LNK files, to proxy the execution of commands or scripts.
Detects the execution of Windowsupdate.exe, a known component of the QUICSILVER campaign. The backdoor is identified by its filename and specific file hash. Once executed, it facilitates system and directory discovery, including hostname enumeration and file system navigation.
Detects the execution of the Windows Installer utility (msiexec.exe) where the command line references an Azure Blob Storage URL. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to download and install malicious MSI packages directly from a remote storage location, bypassing local file creation.
Detects incoming S7comm/ISO-TSAP connection attempts directed at Siemens Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) originating from an external network. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized access or reconnaissance attempts against Industrial Control System (ICS) assets.
Detects S7comm protocol network connections (default port 102) initiated outside of standard business hours (06:00 to 18:00). S7comm is the proprietary protocol used by Siemens S7 PLCs; unauthorized or anomalous interaction with these devices, especially during off-hours, may indicate reconnaissance or manipulation of industrial control systems.
Detects potential exploitation or unauthorized discovery of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) by identifying the use of default SNMP community strings or unauthenticated S7comm protocol sessions.
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