Emiliano Mema
@NosalvaGreeceTrusted contributorCompletionist
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282 detections
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Detects the use of curl.exe to download an MSI file (update_ms.msi) from a remote HTTPS source into the ProgramData directory. This pattern is commonly observed in malware delivery campaigns attempting to deploy payloads in a location with lower access restrictions.
Detects unauthorized network sessions targeting Siemens S7 PLCs. The rule specifically identifies unauthenticated S7comm protocol traffic on TCP port 102 and the usage of default SNMP community strings ('public' or 'private') on port 161, which are indicative of exploitation attempts or unauthorized access to industrial control system (ICS) hardware.
Detects unauthorized S7comm 'GET' or 'Read' operations directed at Siemens S7 Series PLCs over TCP port 102. These commands are often used in reconnaissance phases of ICS/OT attacks to map memory blocks, read ladder logic, or identify system state before executing more disruptive operations.
Detects unauthorized S7comm 'PUT' or 'Write' operations to Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) data blocks or configuration memory that occur outside of defined maintenance or change windows, specifically when no valid work order is associated with the event.
Detects a high-frequency burst of S7comm protocol connection attempts directed at TCP port 102 from a single source to a specific destination PLC. This pattern of rapid, repeated connection attempts is indicative of automated exploit-variant testing or fuzzing against industrial control systems.
Detects the movement of specific files suspected to be related to adversary operations into the Windows Recycle Bin. This activity suggests an attempt to delete or stage evidence of malicious activity while potentially keeping it recoverable.
Detects the creation of a shortcut file named 'SystemIn.lnk' using PowerShell, a technique associated with the QUICSILVER malware to establish persistence. The rule monitors for PowerShell command-line arguments involving 'WScript.Shell' and 'CreateShortcut' alongside the specific file name.
Detects unauthorized command-line shell execution (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by the process 'Windowsupdate.exe', or the execution of a file associated with the malicious hash attributed to the QUICAgent backdoor.
Detects execution of a specific msaRAT MSI custom action that loads an embedded lib.dll payload from the MSI Binary table into memory via msiexec.exe during the InstallFinalize phase.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of .plist files within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory on macOS. This directory is a common location used by adversaries to establish persistence, as files placed here are automatically loaded and executed by the system upon user login.
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