Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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8,655 detections
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This rule detects suspicious activity involving container runtimes (e.g., Docker) that indicates potential container escape attempts or unauthorized host interaction. It flags scenarios where container processes spawn administrative shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) with SYSTEM privileges, instances of privileged container creation, or direct access to physical drives from container management tools, which are common indicators of host filesystem manipulation.
Detects the execution of known privilege escalation tools (JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer) or command-line arguments indicative of token impersonation attempts (e.g., usage of SeImpersonatePrivilege) to escalate privileges on Windows systems.
Detects potential WMI persistence mechanisms by monitoring the execution of 'mofcomp.exe' by non-Microsoft signed binaries, the creation of MOF files in suspicious user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, etc.), and the suspicious execution of 'scrcons.exe', which is the WMI permanent event consumer process.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific keywords associated with memory patching or tampering within the command lines of PowerShell, .NET-based binaries (dotnet.exe, csc.exe, msbuild.exe), and related processes. The rule specifically looks for strings like 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and base64-encoded equivalents often used by offensive security tools to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities.
Detects when a signed process loads a DLL from a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, Downloads, Public folders). This is a common indicator of DLL hijacking or side-loading, where a legitimate signed application is leveraged to load a malicious library from a compromised location.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes using taskkill, tskill, or PowerShell's Stop-Process cmdlet. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus (AV) agents on a compromised system to evade detection.
This rule detects activities associated with credential dumping, specifically targeting techniques that abuse the Directory Replication Service (DRS) protocol, such as DCSync or the use of tools like secretsdump. It monitors both process execution command lines and network traffic for keywords indicative of these credential extraction behaviors, which are commonly used by attackers to obtain domain credentials.
Detects instances where common Windows system processes (dllhost.exe, mmc.exe, svchost.exe) spawn known living-off-the-land binaries (LotLBin) or command-line interpreters. This behavior is often indicative of process injection or malicious activity where an adversary leverages trusted system processes to execute commands or malicious scripts.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving container runtimes (e.g., Docker) that indicates potential container escape attempts or unauthorized host interaction. It flags scenarios where container processes spawn administrative shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) with SYSTEM privileges, instances of privileged container creation, or direct access to physical drives from container management tools, which are common indicators of host filesystem manipulation.
Detects the execution of the Windows binary 'certutil.exe' using flags commonly abused by adversaries to download files from remote URLs or decode base64-encoded files. It excludes instances where certutil is executed by Microsoft-signed processes from the System32 directory to reduce false positives.
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