Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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8,655 detections
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This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Azure AD accounts by identifying users with 10 or more failed sign-in attempts due to invalid credentials within a 5-minute window. It summarizes the failure count and associated IP addresses for each user.
This rule detects potential 'impossible travel' scenarios within Azure AD sign-in logs. It identifies users who successfully sign in to Office 365 from two geographically distant IP addresses within a one-hour window, suggesting a potential compromise or an attempt to bypass security controls.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Azure Active Directory service principals. It specifically looks for a service principal performing multiple (5 or more within an hour) 'Add service principal', 'Add owner to application', or 'Add permission grant' operations. This pattern could indicate an attacker attempting to escalate privileges or establish persistence within an Azure AD environment by manipulating service principals and application permissions.
This rule detects suspicious application consent activity in Azure AD. It identifies instances where a user successfully grants consent to three or more applications within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to resources by tricking users into consenting to malicious applications.
Detects modifications to the 'SSLKEYLOGFILE' environment variable in the Windows Registry. This variable is often used by applications like web browsers to log SSL/TLS session keys to a file, which can then be used to decrypt encrypted network traffic. Malicious actors might enable this to capture sensitive data.
Detects the execution of 'conhost.exe' with the '--headless' argument, specifically when initiated by 'pcalua.exe'. This combination has been observed in attacks by the GOLD BLADE threat group for indirect command execution.
Detects DLL side-loading attacks where consent.exe loads known malicious DLLs (version.dll, rtworkq.dll, wmsgapi.dll, and the older msimg32.dll) from non-standard locations. This technique is used by Shanya-packed malware including EDR Killer and CastleRAT to load malicious payloads while appearing as a legitimate Windows UAC process.
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/proxy execution tools (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are used to inject into other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe) using CreateRemoteThread. The detection is further refined by looking for command-line indicators often associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts.
KQL Query from file: INC Ransomware Command Execution
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