Georg Lauenstein
@gsecTrusted contributorCompletionist
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206 detections
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Detects an npm or pip package installation process spawning a script
interpreter or living-off-the-land binary (powershell, cmd, certutil, bitsadmin, curl,
wget, bash, sh) as a child process. CrowdStrike's 2026 Threat Hunting Report found
adversaries increasingly embed malicious setup/install scripts inside open-source packages
uploaded to npm and PyPI; these scripts execute automatically the moment the package is
written to disk during npm install / pip install, unless intercepted before execution. A
package manager process spawning a scripting engine or download utility immediately after
install is a strong indicator of an embedded malicious postinstall/setup script rather than
a normal build step.
interpreter or living-off-the-land binary (powershell, cmd, certutil, bitsadmin, curl,
wget, bash, sh) as a child process. CrowdStrike's 2026 Threat Hunting Report found
adversaries increasingly embed malicious setup/install scripts inside open-source packages
uploaded to npm and PyPI; these scripts execute automatically the moment the package is
written to disk during npm install / pip install, unless intercepted before execution. A
package manager process spawning a scripting engine or download utility immediately after
install is a strong indicator of an embedded malicious postinstall/setup script rather than
a normal build step.
Detects execution of the XMRig Monero cryptominer or a miner
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
Detects wmic being used to add a Microsoft Defender exclusion for a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" installation directory. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) runs this command via the MSFT_MpPreference WMI class before dropping the CoolClient sideloader (defender.exe) and libngs.dll into that duplicated folder, ensuring the malware is never scanned. The legitimate Windows Defender path does not contain a "Microsoft\" subfolder, making this exclusion target distinctive.
Detects Chrome or Edge being launched in headless mode with the
remote debugging port flag enabled. msaRAT (Chaos ransomware) uses this to spawn
a hidden browser instance it then manipulates via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP)
to inject JavaScript, hijack browser functionality, and build a covert WebRTC
C2 channel that never touches the network directly from the malware process.
remote debugging port flag enabled. msaRAT (Chaos ransomware) uses this to spawn
a hidden browser instance it then manipulates via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP)
to inject JavaScript, hijack browser functionality, and build a covert WebRTC
C2 channel that never touches the network directly from the malware process.
Detects modification of core Ivanti Connect Secure system files on the
appliance. Attackers patch shared libraries and Perl modules such as
/home/lib/libdsplibs.so and /home/perl/DSUpgrade.pm to install an implant that is
loaded by legitimate services, blending malicious code into normal appliance
operation and surviving reboots.
appliance. Attackers patch shared libraries and Perl modules such as
/home/lib/libdsplibs.so and /home/perl/DSUpgrade.pm to install an implant that is
loaded by legitimate services, blending malicious code into normal appliance
operation and surviving reboots.
Detects the odbcconf LOLBin delivery step assessed for the MuddyWater-linked PatchAgent chain: 'odbcconf /f cloud.rsp' launched from a PatchAgent working directory, typically via a ClickFix lure (explorer -> conhost --headless -> cmd -> odbcconf) fetching the response file over WebDAV. odbcconf executing a .rsp response file is rare in legitimate use and is high-fidelity when paired with WebDAV or a user-writable working directory.
Detects a process launch whose command line both references a cron persistence path (crontab, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.{hourly,daily,weekly,monthly}/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) and contains a download-and-execute or reverse-shell marker (curl/wget piped to a shell, /dev/tcp/ redirection, base64-decoded payload, nc -e) or installs the crontab from a file staged under /tmp/. Attackers commonly install a scheduled cron entry so a malicious command re-executes on a fixed interval, surviving reboots and process kills (T1053.003).
Detects use of wmic to add Microsoft Defender scan exclusions via the
MSFT_MpPreference WMI class, targeting a program-files path and executable named to
impersonate Windows Defender. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) ran this exact wmic invocation
before deploying the CoolClient backdoor to a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender"
directory, excluding both the folder and the renamed sideloader defender.exe from
scanning.
MSFT_MpPreference WMI class, targeting a program-files path and executable named to
impersonate Windows Defender. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) ran this exact wmic invocation
before deploying the CoolClient backdoor to a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender"
directory, excluding both the folder and the renamed sideloader defender.exe from
scanning.
Detects creation of a JSP/JSPX/WAR server-side script inside
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
Detects usage of vssadmin or wmic to delete Volume Shadow Copies
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations to prevent system recovery
before encryption deployment.
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations to prevent system recovery
before encryption deployment.
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