Kaung Khant Ko
@kaungkhantkoTrusted contributorCompletionist
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410 detections
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Detects the execution of XWORM malware delivered via the Ghost Crypt crypter service. The attack chain involves a legitimate but vulnerable PDF reader (HaiHaiSoft PDF Reader) side-loading a malicious 'oledlg.dll', which then uses process hypnosis to inject the final XWORM payload into 'csc.exe'. The rule also detects the persistence mechanism used.
Detects the execution of heavily obfuscated PowerShell, characteristic of the MAYBEROBOT backdoor. COLDRIVER uses this script, often via a logon script for persistence, to download and execute further commands. The rule specifically looks for a combination of string replacement functions ('-replace', '\n', ';', '[^\x20-\x7E]') used by MAYBEROBOT for de-obfuscation before execution.
Detects HTTP requests indicative of Oyster malware C2 beaconing, including GET requests to /reg with WordPressAgent User-Agent and application/json Content-Type, GET requests to /login with FingerPrint User-Agent, and GET/POST requests to /api/kcehc or POST requests to /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh.
Detects the creation of a suspicious scheduled task named "CaptureService" that is set to run every 11 minutes. This specific combination of task name, frequency, and executable (rundll32.exe) is indicative of a known persistence technique.
Detects the Oyster delivery via Teams FakeApp by identifying specific HTTP request patterns, including OPTIONS/POST to /create/link and GET to /gov/ paths and
Detects a PowerShell command line pattern used by Snake Keylogger to download and execute a payload. This pattern involves using Invoke-WebRequest to fetch a file and Start-Process to run it, often with parameters to hide the execution window. The rule also looks for execution from a temporary directory, a common malware technique.
Identifies attempts to remove Internet Information Services (IIS) log files using command-line utilities.
Attackers who gain access to IIS-hosted applications commonly remove or truncate IIS log files to evade detection and cover post-exploitation activity. This detection looks for command-line processes (Windows CMD/PowerShell/PowerShell Core) that execute common file-deletion commands against the IIS log folder.
Attackers who gain access to IIS-hosted applications commonly remove or truncate IIS log files to evade detection and cover post-exploitation activity. This detection looks for command-line processes (Windows CMD/PowerShell/PowerShell Core) that execute common file-deletion commands against the IIS log folder.
Detects access to sensitive browser files by non-browser processes. This can indicate attempts by malware to steal credentials, cookies or other sensitive user data.
Detects the loading of a malicious 'pc2msupp.dll' via legitimate applications, a technique used by Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy groups to load RainyDay, Turian, and a new PlugX variant.
Detects modification of shell profile files (.zshrc, .bash_profile, .profile) by processes named 'applet' or 'qtop'. This is a fallback persistence mechanism used by the ChillyHell malware.
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