Kaung Khant Ko
@kaungkhantkoTrusted contributorCompletionist
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410 detections
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Detects outbound network connections to the Telegram API, a technique used by XWorm for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for connections to "api.telegram.org/bot" and "/sendMessage" paths, originating from suspicious processes like WmiPrvSE.exe or Soundman.exe, or from common user-writable locations.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task designed to run with SYSTEM privileges and terminate common AV/EDR processes. This technique is used by kkRAT for persistence and defense evasion.
This rule detects XWorm persistence mechanisms. It looks for the creation of scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts that execute suspicious payloads from the AppData\Roaming directory. The malware is known to use filenames like "WmiPrvSE.exe" (masquerading as a legitimate system file) and "Soundman.exe").
Detects network connections to known XWorm Command and Control (C2) infrastructure (IPs and domains) and the creation of processes with filenames associated with XWorm malware. This rule combines network and process-based indicators to identify potential XWorm infections.
Mustang Panda conducted a phishing campaign against Myanmar entities using a compromised embassy email. The lure involved a PDF with an embedded URL that delivered a ZIP archive containing a trojanized executable and malicious DLL. The malware disguised itself as a PDF, sideloaded the DLL, established persistence, and executed further payloads. It performed system reconnaissance, data exfiltration via SFTP, and defense evasion.
Detects registry queries for software inventory and browser settings as well as suspicious scheduled task creation, techniques observed in LummaC2 malware campaigns. Registry queries target installed software and browser preferences for reconnaissance (T1012). Scheduled tasks ensure persistence (T1053.005)
Detects the initial PowerShell download cradle associated with ClickFix/CORNFLAKE.V3 campaigns. This activity is often the result of a user being tricked into pasting and running a command from a malicious website.
Detects the creation of a .plist file in macOS LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons directories, a technique used by SHAMOS malware for persistence. This rule looks for the specific SHAMOS plist file or for any plist created by a process running from a suspicious location.
Detects the reconfiguration of a virtual machine where a virtual disk (.vmdk) from a different, often critical, VM is attached. This is a key tactic used by threat actors like UNC3944 to perform offline credential theft by mounting a Domain Controller's disk to a staging VM to access the NTDS.dit file.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service configured to start automatically from a suspicious file path. This behavior is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by malware like the Tinky Winkey keylogger.
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