Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
Detects the download of a masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer to the Downloads folder. The rule identifies files matching specific naming conventions, including generated GUIDs, or known malicious hashes, originating from common cloud storage providers often abused by threat actors.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
Detects the execution of known browser credential harvesting tools (WebBrowserPassView, WebBrowserBookmarksView, or WS_Password variants) from ScreenConnect temporary directories. This behavior often indicates post-compromise activity where an adversary uses an existing Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) session to extract credentials from browsers.
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