Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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This rule detects modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPOs) that are either explicitly marked as malicious based on known indicators (GUIDs or 'PAYLOAD' strings) or involve unauthorized modifications to domain-root or organizational unit GPO links. It monitors Active Directory security event logs for object changes.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects invisible/non-printing Unicode codepoints (zero-width chars, bidi overrides, variation selectors, Unicode tag characters, and Private Use Area icon-font codepoints) embedded in process command lines - covering both classic command/script obfuscation and the emerging use of hidden codepoints to smuggle AI prompt-injection payloads into content later processed by AI copilots/agents. Tightened to require 2+ high-confidence codepoint hits (or 1 from a known scripting host/LOLBin), and gates Private-Use-Area-only matches (a common legitimate icon-font false-positive source) to scripting hosts with 5+ hits, maps to T1027.018.
Detects AI agent tooling (e.g., Copilot, Cursor, Ollama) that makes outbound network calls to known AI model providers followed by the execution of suspicious shell commands within a short duration. The rule flags high-severity activities such as download-cradles, credential reconnaissance, LOLBin usage, and persistence mechanisms. Informational alerts are generated for standard CLI activity within the same timeframe.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources (File Events, Certificate Info, Network Events, and DNS Events) to detect known malicious indicators, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs associated with malicious activity.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching file hashes against a known list of malicious indicators and monitoring for suspicious network connections. The network monitoring includes connections to hardcoded malicious IP addresses, specific C2 URLs, and DNS queries for known fallback domains used in malicious infrastructure when the initiating process is not a recognized web browser or wallet application.
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