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Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,370 copies51 likes26,052 views

7,555 detections

Detects anomalous network polling patterns consistent with 'EvilTokens' or similar adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) OAuth phishing kits. The rule identifies web browsers performing high-frequency, low-interval polling (3-6s) against non-reputable/unseen domains (the attacker-controlled status endpoint) immediately preceding or following successful Microsoft OAuth device-code authentication sequences.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
104
Detects a specific multi-stage exfiltration pattern characterized by initial reconnaissance/fingerprinting probes against sensitive service endpoints (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) followed by unauthorized access to artifact storage endpoints (/files or /file?name=) from the same device against the same host within a short timeframe.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects a specific multi-stage exfiltration pattern characterized by initial reconnaissance/fingerprinting probes against sensitive service endpoints (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) followed by unauthorized access to artifact storage endpoints (/files or /file?name=) from the same device against the same host within a short timeframe.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
000
Detects the anomalous behavior of a Node.js process acting as a typosquatting agent. The detection identifies a node.exe process initiating a network connection to a known malicious C2 IP and port, followed by the termination of that same process within 45 seconds. This pattern is consistent with the agent crashing due to an unhandled exception (e.g., os.userInfo() failure) after beaconing.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
Detects the anomalous behavior of a Node.js process acting as a typosquatting agent. The detection identifies a node.exe process initiating a network connection to a known malicious C2 IP and port, followed by the termination of that same process within 45 seconds. This pattern is consistent with the agent crashing due to an unhandled exception (e.g., os.userInfo() failure) after beaconing.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects the anomalous behavior of a Node.js process acting as a typosquatting agent. The detection identifies a node.exe process initiating a network connection to a known malicious C2 IP and port, followed by the termination of that same process within 45 seconds. This pattern is consistent with the agent crashing due to an unhandled exception (e.g., os.userInfo() failure) after beaconing.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects network activity associated with a malicious NPM package (typosquatting) beaconing to a known C2 server (69.48.229.140) and performing command and control operations, including command polling and data exfiltration, specifically from a Node.js environment.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects network activity associated with a malicious NPM package (typosquatting) beaconing to a known C2 server (69.48.229.140) and performing command and control operations, including command polling and data exfiltration, specifically from a Node.js environment.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
000
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
102
Detects PamStealer-style browser credential theft on macOS. The detection logic identifies the forced termination of browser helper processes using 'pkill' (which releases SQLite file locks) followed by the execution of a 'KcHelper' binary that uses specific environment markers (e.g., KC_PASS) to bypass keychain authorization prompts and steal stored browser credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
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