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Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,370 copies51 likes26,063 views

7,555 detections

Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
002
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
002
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
002
Detects HTTP GET requests to external services 'trycloudflare.com' or 'workers.dev' that return a file content starting with the 'MZ' and 'PE' header signatures within the first 256 bytes, indicating a Windows executable payload download often associated with AvisLoader activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
002
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Matches known SHA-256 hashes of AvisLoader toolkit components recovered from an exposed staging server: the Windows loader client, UAC-bypass helper, and process-hiding DLL
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
002
Detects AvisLoader Windows loader requiring both decoy non-executable packer-named sections and an embedded c-toxcore developer build path to co-occur in a valid PE
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects AvisLoader Windows loader requiring both decoy non-executable packer-named sections and an embedded c-toxcore developer build path to co-occur in a valid PE
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
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