Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,383 copies51 likes26,115 views
7,555 detections
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Detects a .NET-hosting PE module (e.g. I++u.dll) that references both the NuGet-package-concealed Build.dat loader stage and the subsequent execute_engine_disconnect.raw decrypted container, matching the V2 ClickFix loader chain
Detects a .NET-hosting PE module (e.g. I++u.dll) that references both the NuGet-package-concealed Build.dat loader stage and the subsequent execute_engine_disconnect.raw decrypted container, matching the V2 ClickFix loader chain
Detects a .NET-hosting PE module (e.g. I++u.dll) that references both the NuGet-package-concealed Build.dat loader stage and the subsequent execute_engine_disconnect.raw decrypted container, matching the V2 ClickFix loader chain
Detects a .NET-hosting PE module (e.g. I++u.dll) that references both the NuGet-package-concealed Build.dat loader stage and the subsequent execute_engine_disconnect.raw decrypted container, matching the V2 ClickFix loader chain
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a bypass execution policy that performs a download or web request to save content to a file in the user's temp directory, followed by the immediate execution of that file. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware droppers or fileless attack techniques attempting to stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary locations.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a bypass execution policy that performs a download or web request to save content to a file in the user's temp directory, followed by the immediate execution of that file. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware droppers or fileless attack techniques attempting to stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary locations.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
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