Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading activity where legitimate, signed binaries (such as COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) are executed from non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Downloads) while loading specifically identified malicious or sideloaded DLLs. The detection identifies patterns where these binaries operate outside their expected vendor installation paths, indicating a likely attempt to hijack execution flow.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading activity where legitimate, signed binaries (such as COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) are executed from non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Downloads) while loading specifically identified malicious or sideloaded DLLs. The detection identifies patterns where these binaries operate outside their expected vendor installation paths, indicating a likely attempt to hijack execution flow.
This rule detects scenarios where an AI agent executes shell commands or system-level tools immediately after receiving a prompt injection attack from an untrusted source. It correlates agent audit logs—specifically identifying tool calls flagged for prompt injection—with actual endpoint process creation events. It flags process execution as 'High' severity if the command line matches common malicious patterns like encoded commands, IEX, or attempts to access credential material (e.g., lsass, mimikatz).
This rule detects scenarios where an AI agent executes shell commands or system-level tools immediately after receiving a prompt injection attack from an untrusted source. It correlates agent audit logs—specifically identifying tool calls flagged for prompt injection—with actual endpoint process creation events. It flags process execution as 'High' severity if the command line matches common malicious patterns like encoded commands, IEX, or attempts to access credential material (e.g., lsass, mimikatz).
Detects reconnaissance behavior (System Information, Account, and Network Discovery) performed by processes associated with AI and LLM coding assistants. The rule monitors for a chain of suspicious activities, such as executing discovery commands or excessive network scanning within a 10-minute window, identifying potential misuse of developer-oriented agent tools for post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects reconnaissance behavior (System Information, Account, and Network Discovery) performed by processes associated with AI and LLM coding assistants. The rule monitors for a chain of suspicious activities, such as executing discovery commands or excessive network scanning within a 10-minute window, identifying potential misuse of developer-oriented agent tools for post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects reconnaissance behavior (System Information, Account, and Network Discovery) performed by processes associated with AI and LLM coding assistants. The rule monitors for a chain of suspicious activities, such as executing discovery commands or excessive network scanning within a 10-minute window, identifying potential misuse of developer-oriented agent tools for post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
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