Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects rapid, sequential identity-validation API calls (such as GetCallerIdentity, GetSessionToken, or AssumeRole) performed across a large number of distinct AWS access keys from a single source within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of automated tooling validating a harvested corpus of AWS access keys to identify active credentials.
Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Kimsuky command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Stella_Gary campaign. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/unicorn/mort.php' or '/unicorn/uni.txt') commonly used by this threat actor for beaconing.
Detects the Stella_Gary .NET backdoor loader used by Kimsuky/APT-C-55, identified by managed-layer reflective assembly loading strings (loader.Program.Main, AssemblyResolve callback, Stella_Gary.Program.Main)
Detects the Stella_Gary .NET backdoor loader used by Kimsuky/APT-C-55, identified by managed-layer reflective assembly loading strings (loader.Program.Main, AssemblyResolve callback, Stella_Gary.Program.Main)
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
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