Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects a host making 3 or more outbound connections within 5 minutes to AWS-hosted IP addresses known to host NJRAT C2 infrastructure from the GTA6 lure campaign, consistent with periodic RAT beaconing rather than a one-off incidental connection.
Detects a host making 3 or more outbound connections within 5 minutes to AWS-hosted IP addresses known to host NJRAT C2 infrastructure from the GTA6 lure campaign, consistent with periodic RAT beaconing rather than a one-off incidental connection.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
This rule detects DNS queries for the hardcoded domain 'gsx.uk.com', which is associated with the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure of BabylonRAT malware.
This rule detects DNS queries for the hardcoded domain 'gsx.uk.com', which is associated with the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure of BabylonRAT malware.
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