Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects the execution of PostgreSQL dump utilities (pg_dump, pg_dumpall) initiated directly by application-level processes like Langflow or Python, rather than through standard system-level task schedulers. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized data collection or staging of database contents by an application process.
Detects the execution of PostgreSQL dump utilities (pg_dump, pg_dumpall) initiated directly by application-level processes like Langflow or Python, rather than through standard system-level task schedulers. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized data collection or staging of database contents by an application process.
Detects the execution of PostgreSQL dump utilities (pg_dump, pg_dumpall) initiated directly by application-level processes like Langflow or Python, rather than through standard system-level task schedulers. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized data collection or staging of database contents by an application process.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns originating from Langflow or Nacos AI orchestration services, including the spawning of sensitive binaries like cmd, powershell, or scripts (python/bash/sh) with suspicious command-line arguments. Additionally, it identifies potential exploitation attempts targeting known-vulnerable API endpoints (code validation and Nacos user authentication).
Detects suspicious process execution patterns originating from Langflow or Nacos AI orchestration services, including the spawning of sensitive binaries like cmd, powershell, or scripts (python/bash/sh) with suspicious command-line arguments. Additionally, it identifies potential exploitation attempts targeting known-vulnerable API endpoints (code validation and Nacos user authentication).
Detects attempts to bypass authentication on Nacos servers, including the use of spoofed Nacos-Server User-Agent headers, suspicious API query patterns missing required access tokens, and the subsequent use of forged JWT tokens signed with default keys.
Detects attempts to bypass authentication on Nacos servers, including the use of spoofed Nacos-Server User-Agent headers, suspicious API query patterns missing required access tokens, and the subsequent use of forged JWT tokens signed with default keys.
Detects rapid, non-interactive ransomware-like behavior characterized by system reconnaissance followed by automated bulk file deletion of model/data files (e.g., .ckpt, .pt). The rule identifies campaigns where discovery, lateral movement or automated execution, and destructive impact occur within a 3-hour window without any interactive user login evidence.
Detects high-volume authentication attempts against Fortinet network appliances where multiple distinct source IPs successfully authenticate against multiple distinct accounts matching specific administrative naming patterns. This pattern is indicative of potential credential stuffing or brute-force campaigns targeting edge infrastructure.
Detects successful post-delivery email remediation actions (such as ZAP, manual deletion, or moving to junk) performed on emails associated with the Operation DoppelBrand campaign, identified by specific sender domains (service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) or suspicious invoice-fraud subject lines.
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