Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects phishing attempts related to 'Operation DoppelBrand' campaign using common email service providers (ESPs) to spoof legitimate-looking emails with fraud-themed subjects, such as invoices or payment requests, associated with the Brickstorm malware.
Detects inbound emails that spoof ServiceNow branding or impersonate high-level organizational roles (e.g., CEO, VP, President) in the display name while using common reply/forward subject headers. The rule specifically flags these if the sender domain does not originate from a legitimate service-now.com domain and contains PDF or HTML attachments, which are common vectors for credential harvesting or malware delivery.
No description available.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
This rule detects suspicious command executions (e.g., whoami, downloadstring, iex, registry modifications) initiated by processes associated with the CrowdStrike Falcon agent. It also correlates these executions with the loading of unsigned or unverifiable DLLs by the same Falcon processes within a 5-minute window, which may indicate attempts to tamper with or masquerade as the security agent.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts (CVE-2026-59822) against LiteLLM MCP tool endpoints. It identifies HTTP requests where the authorization bearer token is unusually short (<= 12 chars), lacks the 'sk-' prefix, and does not appear to be a valid JWT, yet successfully results in a 200 OK status, indicating a potential bypass of authentication logic.
Detects instances where LiteLLM, or related Python application processes (uvicorn, python), spawn a shell or command-line utility (bash, sh, id) under the root user account. This behavior is indicative of potential container breakout, application exploitation, or privilege escalation attempts originating from a web-accessible service.
Detects incoming HTTP requests to sensitive LiteLLM endpoints (/mcp and /guardrails) which are typically intended for internal or controlled use. Exposing these to the public internet may allow unauthorized individuals to interact with, enumerate, or exploit the LiteLLM framework's capabilities.
Detects HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE persistence via Run-key registry writes or reg.exe command-line adds, scoped to payloads staged in AppData/ProgramData/Temp/Public/Downloads and excluding legitimate Program Files/System32 targets to reduce false positives from normal software autorun entries.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards domains identified as part of Storm-3121/Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These domains are themed around passkey management and single sign-on (SSO) services, likely intended for credential harvesting.
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