Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,360 copies51 likes26,024 views
7,555 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,650
1,006
394
169
98
Categories
2,356
1,807
1,233
1,013
924
Platforms
4,191
1,622
1,250
676
676
Products / Services
2,820
1,003
991
720
485
MITRE Techniques
2,087
1,520
1,413
1,070
536
CVEs
38
33
24
22
21
IDS Classtypes
477
179
104
79
52
IDS Protocols
554
156
144
86
18
Detects Certificate Transparency log entries indicating the issuance of Let's Encrypt certificates where the issuer identifies as 'YE1' and the domain subjects match specific brand impersonation tokens, often associated with fraudulent disposable top-level domains.
Detects Certificate Transparency log entries indicating the issuance of Let's Encrypt certificates where the issuer identifies as 'YE1' and the domain subjects match specific brand impersonation tokens, often associated with fraudulent disposable top-level domains.
Detects Certificate Transparency log entries indicating the issuance of Let's Encrypt certificates where the issuer identifies as 'YE1' and the domain subjects match specific brand impersonation tokens, often associated with fraudulent disposable top-level domains.
Detects sensitive data exfiltration attempts (PII, credit card, OTP) via HTTP POST requests to suspicious lookalike domains, followed by a WebSocket connection to known IronToll C2 infrastructure.
Detects sensitive data exfiltration attempts (PII, credit card, OTP) via HTTP POST requests to suspicious lookalike domains, followed by a WebSocket connection to known IronToll C2 infrastructure.
This rule monitors TLS traffic for a specific combination of certificate issuer Common Name (CN) matching 'YE1' and Server Name Indication (SNI) hostnames using known disposable or high-risk top-level domains (TLDs). This behavior is associated with the IronToll campaign, often indicative of command-and-control communication or malicious infrastructure staging.
This rule monitors TLS traffic for a specific combination of certificate issuer Common Name (CN) matching 'YE1' and Server Name Indication (SNI) hostnames using known disposable or high-risk top-level domains (TLDs). This behavior is associated with the IronToll campaign, often indicative of command-and-control communication or malicious infrastructure staging.
Detects anomalous actions within the Coder registry, such as template creation, version updates, or dry-run/workspace builds with module caching disabled, that occurred during a known registry compromise window on August 31, 2026.
Detects cached malicious dlp.sh/dlp-docker.sh Terraform module artifacts served from the compromised registry.coder.com infrastructure
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
Page 606 of 756