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Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,360 copies51 likes26,023 views

7,555 detections

Detects the PoisonedRefresh implant's UNIX domain socket backdoor by (1) file activity on the uniquely-named /run/bigtlog.pipe socket initiated by an Apache/httpd process, and (2) process command lines containing the implant's hardcoded authentication token. Removed the earlier generic 'bash spawned by httpd' heuristic, which fired on legitimate CGI/mod_php/admin automation that shells out from the web server and was the dominant false-positive source.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
003
Detects possible unauthenticated exploitation attempts against CVE-2025-53521 (F5 BIG-IP APM RCE). Tightened from a generic 'any POST without a cookie on 443/8443' match (extremely broad, alerts on ordinary cookie-less API/health-check traffic) to POST requests specifically targeting F5 APM access-policy processing endpoints (/my.policy, /vdesk/) that lack a session cookie, since the CVE requires an access policy configured on the virtual server and legitimate APM sessions carry a session cookie. Added detection_filter (3 hits/60s per source) to suppress single incidental matches and prioritize repeated attempts. Note: public reporting for this CVE does not include the exact exploit URI/payload, so this is a behavioral/namespace heuristic, not a payload-specific signature — validate against your own APM traffic baseline and update once exploit specifics are published.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
203
Detects trojanized 7z.dll loader and encrypted GRAYRABBIT payload components dropped during the UNC3569 exploit chain
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects trojanized 7z.dll loader and encrypted GRAYRABBIT payload components dropped during the UNC3569 exploit chain
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects JFrog Artifactory access-token issuance events on/after the suspected compromise window (2026-08-28) where the token is tied to the anonymous identity, granted administrator scope, or has no attributable initiating user, per Fastly's remediation guidance.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects reconnaissance commands (e.g., file listing, directory enumeration) executed as child processes of the JFrog Artifactory service. This behavior is often associated with the exploitation of Artifactory plugins or misconfigured endpoints that allow arbitrary code execution, enabling an attacker to perform discovery actions.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
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