Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,359 copies51 likes25,968 views
7,555 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,650
1,006
394
169
98
Categories
2,356
1,807
1,233
1,013
924
Platforms
4,191
1,622
1,250
676
676
Products / Services
2,820
1,003
991
720
485
MITRE Techniques
2,087
1,520
1,413
1,070
536
CVEs
38
33
24
22
21
IDS Classtypes
477
179
104
79
52
IDS Protocols
554
156
144
86
18
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects indicators of the ProRAM malware dropper, specifically identifying the download of 'sideload.exe' from an external IP or the presence of file artifacts related to its staging process in %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA% directories.
Detects the loading of the ProRAM implant DLL (somkernl.dll) when initiated by known sideloading carriers such as 360speedld.exe or SoftupNotify.exe, which are signed utilities frequently abused for this purpose.
Detects high-frequency SYN scanning activity targeting TCP port 37777 (commonly associated with Dahua devices) from an external source. This behavior is indicative of automated reconnaissance or mass-scanning campaigns, such as Operation CameraSwarm, attempting to identify exposed or potentially vulnerable IoT/surveillance hardware.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
This rule monitors for the creation or presence of a specific backdoor account (username 'p2pwn' and password 'p2password') on Dahua devices. This account is known to be injected by threat actors exploiting CVE-2024-39943 as part of Operation CameraSwarm to maintain persistent unauthorized access.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to execute processes, particularly when a remote node target is specified or when using common WMI process creation arguments. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution while attempting to blend into administrative activity. Legitimate management tools have been excluded from the scope to reduce noise.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets such as Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod, Get-CimInstance, or Get-WmiObject to interact with the Win32_Process class for process creation on local or remote systems. This behavior is frequently associated with administrative activity but is also commonly used by adversaries for remote command execution and lateral movement.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (wmiprvse.exe) launches suspicious command-line interfaces or interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, cscript, etc.), or executes scripts from sensitive/temporary directories. The rule includes exclusions for common management tools to reduce noise.
Detects anomalous system reconnaissance activity performed using WMIC or PowerShell Get-WmiObject commands. The rule tracks distinct command-line executions per device and flags hosts where three or more unique reconnaissance commands are executed within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating system configuration, hotfixes, or hardware details.
Page 621 of 756