avatar

Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,359 copies51 likes25,969 views

7,555 detections

Detects the loading of WMI-related DLLs (wbemcomn.dll, wbemprox.dll) by processes that are commonly abused to proxy execution (LOLBins) such as certutil, mshta, or office applications. This behavior is often associated with WMI-based persistence or execution techniques.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
101
Detects the loading of WMI-related DLLs (wbemcomn.dll, wbemprox.dll) by processes that are commonly abused to proxy execution (LOLBins) such as certutil, mshta, or office applications. This behavior is often associated with WMI-based persistence or execution techniques.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects specific outbound HTTP POST requests to a known Amatera Stealer command and control domain. The rule looks for the unique URI path '/T.@w' and a specific 'Command: GetEndpoints' header structure commonly used by this malware family to beacon to its C2 infrastructure.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects specific outbound HTTP POST requests to a known Amatera Stealer command and control domain. The rule looks for the unique URI path '/T.@w' and a specific 'Command: GetEndpoints' header structure commonly used by this malware family to beacon to its C2 infrastructure.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments involving 'DavWWWRoot' and external domains ('pf.ch' or 'verification.google'), which is characteristic of attempts to force remote WebDAV authentication or execute malicious code via network-hosted resources.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume phishing emails that utilize subjects claiming extreme discounts (e.g., 65% off) and contain links to domains ending in the .shop top-level domain (TLD). The rule correlates email subjects with URL domains and alerts when multiple recipients are targeted by the same sender/domain combination.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume phishing emails that utilize subjects claiming extreme discounts (e.g., 65% off) and contain links to domains ending in the .shop top-level domain (TLD). The rule correlates email subjects with URL domains and alerts when multiple recipients are targeted by the same sender/domain combination.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Page 622 of 756