Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,544 detections
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Detects incoming emails that impersonate DocuSign notifications, specifically looking for typical phishing lures involving 'Remittance Advice' and a call-to-action to 'Tap here to view document'. This rule identifies emails using common social engineering tactics to harvest credentials or distribute malware via fake document links.
Detects periodic TLS network beacons to external destinations on port 443, characteristic of the BridgeAgent malware. The rule identifies suspicious outbound connections that exhibit consistent, repetitive behavior patterns, potentially indicating C2 communication. It is recommended to correlate this network activity with EDR alerts focusing on masquerading processes, specifically instances where binaries like gnome-shell are running as root and persisted via service mechanisms like zabbix_agent.service.
Detects network-based command signaling shared by the Fire Ant/REPTILE-derivative backdoor and its reverse-tunneling implant capability. Identifies the 'magic string' activation sequence and matching 'kill marker' termination sequence over TCP and UDP — indicative of packet-triggered backdoor activation, port-knocking style C2, or reverse-tunnel establishment via raw socket communication.
Detects high-volume internal email campaigns that exhibit characteristics of phishing, specifically utilizing sender display name impersonation of executive or IT support roles, urgent subject lines, and URLs identified as malicious by threat intelligence. The rule tracks common attributes like SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures and rapid delivery to multiple recipients.
No description available.
Detects the execution of cmstp.exe with the /au parameter, which is commonly used to install malicious INF files, when initiated by LockAppHost.exe. This pattern is often indicative of an attempt to bypass application control or achieve privilege escalation by leveraging the legitimate Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior shortly after a successful MFA-authenticated session in Microsoft 365. This rule flags scenarios where a subsequent session for the same user occurs within a short window (30 minutes) from a different IP, ASN, User-Agent, or device identifier, potentially indicating the replay of a stolen session cookie obtained via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing.
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
Detects instances where the Grafana MCP (Model Context Protocol) server's service account identity executes administrative tools (such as 'grafana_api_request') within a session that lacks a verified, prior authentication event (bearer token). This pattern suggests an adversary may be spoofing or hijacking a privileged service account session to perform unauthorized administrative actions.
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