Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,316 copies51 likes25,737 views
7,544 detections
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Detects execution of PowerShell.exe initiated by cplsupport.exe with hidden window styles and non-interactive, no-profile flags, which is often indicative of obfuscated command execution or malicious script activity.
Detects the modification or creation of the 'SealedConfig' value within the 'Software\synapse\Config' registry key, correlated with the deletion of a 'config.toml' file on the same device. This pattern may indicate an adversary tampering with Synapse software configuration or attempting to remove audit/configuration trails.
Detects the presence of Toy Ghouls' mqtt-bird-agent or matrix-bird-agent backdoor binaries. These binaries are identified by specific filenames, the inclusion of ChaCha20-Poly1305 cryptographic indicators, and operations involving the Windows MachineGuid registry key used to seal configuration files.
Detects network activity related to the Toy Ghouls 'matrix-bird-agent' backdoor. The rule identifies communication with the domain 'meet.element.tw' via TLS SNI and HTTP host headers, as well as specific Matrix API event types (m.bird.status, m.bird.metrics, m.bird.cmd_response) and references to 'panel-bot' within the HTTP request body, indicating potential command-and-control behavior.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
This rule monitors for email events where the email is flagged for suspicious properties (SPF/DKIM/DMARC failure, threat categorization) and includes potentially malicious attachments or URLs. It then correlates these suspicious emails with subsequent process execution events on the recipient's endpoint within a 30-minute window, identifying a potential successful execution of a phishing payload.
Detects the addition of suspicious file names or known potentially unwanted program artifacts to Windows Run registry keys, often used for persistence. The rule correlates registry modifications with potential installer process activity.
Detects a pattern of multiple failed authentication attempts (brute force) from an external IP address followed by a successful authentication event on remote access services such as RDP, VPN, or NTLM. The rule filters for non-private IP addresses and flags successes occurring outside of standard business hours.
This rule monitors web server logs (IIS, W3C, and Azure Application Gateway) for incoming traffic that matches known malicious or automated vulnerability scanners, as well as requests for common system fingerprinting paths (such as /server-status or /.git/config). The rule aggregates these hits by source IP address to identify potential active reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning attempts.
This rule identifies potential phishing emails that impersonate OneDrive sharing notifications. It correlates email messages containing keywords typically associated with document sharing (e.g., 'OneDrive', 'shared', 'file') with subsequent user URL clicks. Crucially, the rule filters for clicks to domains that are not explicitly related to legitimate OneDrive, SharePoint, or 1drv.ms hosting, indicating a potential attempt to lure users to a malicious third-party site under the guise of file sharing.
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