Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe for potentially malicious purposes. Specifically, it flags certutil.exe being used for decoding or cached URL operations, and bitsadmin.exe being used to initiate file transfers from remote URLs or network paths. These tools are commonly abused by attackers for file staging, ingress tool transfer, and deobfuscation of malicious payloads.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activity by identifying DNS requests with suspicious characteristics, such as the use of TXT/NULL query types, high-entropy subdomains, or oversized queries. It further aggregates these suspicious requests per parent domain and flags scenarios where a high volume of requests or unique subdomains are observed, indicating possible data exfiltration or C2 communication.
Detects known components of the Sauron malware, including MSI installers, side-loaded executables (rnpkeys.exe), and malicious DLLs (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll) by matching known SHA-256 file hashes. It also includes a YARA rule for detecting PE binaries containing the string 'Sauron'.
Detects the presence of MSI installer packages associated with the Sauron Loader malware, which stage malicious files (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, and tdwp.dll) into the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory to facilitate DLL side-loading.
This rule detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern, where an adversary tricks a user into copying and pasting a malicious command into a terminal. The command typically involves using 'base64 -D' to decode an attacker-supplied blob directly into a bash interpreter, often initiated by a Terminal emulator and containing strings related to fake reCAPTCHA or robot verification.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll' in close temporal proximity to the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe' from 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll'. This pattern mimics the persistence mechanism used by the Sauron malware (a.k.a. Strider) to execute its loader chain.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects DLL side-loading activity where the legitimate-looking process rnpkeys.exe, located in a non-standard ProgramData sub-directory, loads a malicious rnp.dll from the same directory, a behavior observed with the Sauron Loader malware.
Detects the creation of a remote thread targeting the native Windows utility 'attrib.exe'. This behavior is characteristic of code injection techniques, such as those used by the Sauron loader, where malicious shellcode is executed within the context of a legitimate system process to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Detects the Sauron Loader malware utilizing the process rnpkeys.exe as a parent to spawn common LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) or execute payloads from temporary directories. This behavior is indicative of a secondary stage execution chain typical of the Sauron Loader.
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