Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,056 copies47 likes38,420 views
11,679 detections
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Detects the execution of the Sauron Loader malware, which utilizes a DLL side-loading chain involving rnpkeys.exe loading rnp.dll or tdwp.dll from a specific ProgramData path, indicating potential malicious activity.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe performing the installation or staging of specific binary files (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, and tdwp.dll) into the C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ directory, which is a known behavior associated with the Sauron Loader malware.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll' using either schtasks.exe command line arguments or Windows Event ID 4698. This specific task name is associated with the persistence mechanism of the Sauron Loader, particularly when it references 'rnpkeys.exe' or 'ProgramData\keyroll'.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll' using either schtasks.exe command line arguments or Windows Event ID 4698. This specific task name is associated with the persistence mechanism of the Sauron Loader, particularly when it references 'rnpkeys.exe' or 'ProgramData\keyroll'.
Detects network communication from 'rnpkeys.exe' to external IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of the Sauron Loader malware, which utilizes a side-loaded 'rnpkeys.exe' binary to establish beaconing and C2 communication as part of its registration process.
Detects a potential vishing or technical support scam scenario by identifying a burst of email traffic to a user (email bombing) followed within one hour by the execution of a remote assistance tool (Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance, or AnyDesk) on the same user's endpoint.
Detects the installation of AI-related packages (e.g., mcp, tiktoken_mcp) via common package managers (pip, npm, docker) followed by an outbound network connection from the same host within 10 minutes. This behavior is consistent with supply chain attacks where trojanized AI/MCP components are used to initiate command-and-control communication shortly after deployment.
Detects the execution of bash commands containing base64 decoding instructions, often used by adversaries to decode and execute obfuscated scripts or payloads. The rule specifically looks for command lines invoking base64 along with keywords like 'echo' or 'reCAPTCHA', which are commonly associated with malicious droppers or phishing-related scripts.
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