
Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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Detects reconnaissance commands related to system domain, locale, and environment settings following the execution of rnpkeys.exe from C:\ProgramData\keyroll, a behavior associated with the Sauron Loader. The rule identifies suspicious system discovery commands (nltest, whoami, etc.) or environment checks performed shortly after the loader's execution, indicating potential target verification before C2 registration.
Detects unpacked Sauron Loader DLL samples by identifying the embedded configuration structure. The rule searches for a specific 4-byte magic header (0xbaadf00d), specific configuration field strings ('group_id' and 'build_id'), and RSA key length markers consistent with the loader's known cryptographic configuration structure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at the '/api/credentials' URI, a pattern associated with AMOS Stealer credential exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple requests occur from a single source within a short timeframe.
This rule detects network activity associated with the Sauron Loader malware. It monitors for TLS connections to known hardcoded C2 domains and identifies HTTP requests following a specific pattern of randomized command and control (C2) paths combined with suspicious User-Agent headers (Windows NT with Edge/Edg).
Detects the creation of a Windows service that points to a .sys file located in common temporary directories (Temp, Windows\Temp). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to load malicious kernel drivers, often for persistence or privilege escalation, such as in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks.
Detects Sauron Loader DLLs by identifying specific configuration blob magic values (0xbaadf00d), associated flags, and internal strings like 'group_id' or 'build_id' that suggest the presence of malicious configuration or RSA key material.
Detects unpacked Sauron Loader DLL samples by identifying specific binary structures, including the magic value 0xbaadf00d and subsequent flag bytes (0x40) often found in its embedded configuration blob.
Detects unpacked Sauron Loader DLL samples by identifying specific binary structures, including the magic value 0xbaadf00d and subsequent flag bytes (0x40) often found in its embedded configuration blob.
Detects instances where a user pastes and executes commands, specifically those containing reCAPTCHA verification strings or base64-encoded bash commands, within a macOS Terminal session. This behavior is indicative of a 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is tricked into manually executing malicious commands in their shell.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity related to the AMOS (Atomic macOS) information stealer. It identifies a specific sequence of network requests where an initial registration beacon (POST /api/t) is followed by a shell agent request (GET /api/shell/agent) within 120 seconds, originating from the same destination IP and port.
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