Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
Detects the MSI installer (msiexec.exe) creating files within the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, which is characteristic of the staging phase for the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading trio (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, tdwp.dll).
Detects a suspicious pattern where an endpoint initiates an HTTP GET request to a known staging IP with a specific 'force=1' parameter, followed by the execution of a bash shell process. This behavior is associated with the ClickFix attack chain used to deliver AMOS Stealer payloads on macOS.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
This rule detects the execution of common remote access tools (Quick Assist, AnyDesk) on a host that does not have a prior history of using those specific tools. This is intended to identify potential hands-on-keyboard activity by adversaries following initial access via social engineering, such as vishing or email-bombing, where they attempt to establish a persistent remote access foothold.
Detects the execution of the 'rnpkeys.exe' file from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll\' directory. The location and filename are highly atypical and could indicate unauthorized tool usage, potential persistence, or malicious activity.
This rule detects when a user or service account accesses or downloads a high volume of files from SharePoint or OneDrive that match sensitive keywords such as 'password', 'secret', 'credential', or specific file extensions like '.pem', '.pfx', and '.env'. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to harvest credentials, API keys, or configuration secrets from cloud storage repositories.
This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious script or executable files (.bat, .ps1, .exe, .vbs) within the Windows Startup folder. It triggers when these files are created by processes typically used for automation or development (dotnet, python) or processes utilizing specific semantic/download-related command lines. The rule further correlates this activity with the presence of PowerShell commands indicative of script downloading or code execution (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) by the same device within the same timeframe, suggesting persistent execution of potentially malicious code.
Detects high-frequency file deletion events originating from processes with names or command-line indicators associated with AI orchestration frameworks like Semantic Kernel. This behavior may indicate an adversary abusing legitimate AI agent tools to perform unauthorized data destruction.
This rule detects outbound HTTP GET requests initiated by a process using a 'WebClient' user-agent to retrieve a file named 'shell.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries downloading second-stage PowerShell payloads to a compromised host.
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