Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, including TLS SNI traffic to its hard-coded C2 domain, initial beaconing over HTTPS to specific paths, and potential exfiltration or reconnaissance markers in the server's Set-Cookie header response.
Detects the RatHat post-uninstall persistence sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies a daemon that silently reinstalls an APK using 'pm install' from a temporary directory, followed by the programmatic enabling of Accessibility Service settings without user interaction.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the NeedyMantis actor, specifically identifying a hardcoded outdated Firefox/21.0 User-Agent in HTTP requests attempting to upgrade to a WebSocket connection, as well as direct TLS communication with the identified C2 domain corp.tripswithengine.com.
Detects the execution of the 'getevent' debugging utility within an Android ADB shell context, specifically targeting raw input events from /dev/input. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized input monitoring, such as capturing PINs, patterns, or passwords via touch coordinate tracking.
Detects communication patterns associated with the RatHat Android banking trojan. The rule identifies a multi-stage C2 flow: first, the device fetches malicious overlay configurations (templates for spoofed login screens) and subsequently exfiltrates captured credentials or form data to the adversary's infrastructure via POST requests.
Detects RatHat Android dropper applications that utilize automated build rotation to bypass file hash-based detection. The rule identifies stable artifacts, such as specific native library names, string obfuscation indicators, and manifest structure anomalies, that persist across these regenerated builds.
Detects the NeedyMantis second-stage loader, typically encountered as a malicious script (e.g., encryptbase64.ps1). The detection identifies raw shellcode residing in files that exhibit specific traits: PEB-walking for API resolution using a ROR(11) hashing algorithm, the inclusion of the 'RtlDecompressBuffer' API for payload expansion, and the absence of standard PowerShell script headers at the start of the file.
Detects Android applications that request Device Admin privileges followed by the execution of coercive commands, such as disabling biometric authentication, setting admin passwords, or enabling uninstall protection. This behavior is indicative of malicious applications (e.g., RatHat) aiming to establish persistence and prevent uninstallation by the user or security software.
Detects NeedyMantis malware loader components that utilize the RtlDecompressBuffer API for custom XOR-compressed archive extraction. The rule specifically looks for the presence of known staged file names (dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll, or encryptbase64.ps1) alongside decoy file references typically used by the threat actor.
Detects the NeedyMantis malware component loading configuration and communications modules (specifically dnsapi.dll or ws2_32.dll) from a non-standard system directory. This behavior is indicative of DLL hijacking or side-loading, where a malicious library is substituted for a legitimate Windows system library to facilitate command and control or malicious execution.
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